Measuring electricity security risk by Dakpogan, Arnaud & Smit, Eon
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Measuring electricity security risk
Arnaud Dakpogan and Eon Smit
University of Stellenbosch Business School
24 September 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89295/
MPRA Paper No. 89295, posted 8 October 2018 12:01 UTC
1 
 
CHAPTER 2 
MEASURING ELECTRICITY SECURITY RISK 
*Arnaud Dakpogan, University of Stellenbosch Business School, +27846206077, 19600585@sun.ac.za 
Eon Smit, University of Stellenbosch Business School, +2721 9184225,  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last several decades, the concept of energy security has become the focus in different 
fields, government, industries, and has also been considered in many countries as a national 
security issue (Vivoda, 2010; Ang, Choong and Ng, 2015). Many factors have justified such 
attention: volatility in oil prices, political instability in energy exporting countries, increasing 
dependency of industrialized countries on energy, military conflicts in energy exporting areas, 
limited oil reserves, climate change issues, competition in access and supply of energy, important 
disruptions in the supply of energy within importing countries, etc. (Vivoda, 2010; Bielecki, 2002; 
Jonsson, Johansson, Månsson, Nilsson, Nilsson and Sonnsjö, 2015; Kaare Koppel and Leppiman, 
2013; Kunz, 2012; Asif and Muneer, 2007; Haghighi, 2007; Aparicio, Pinilla and Serrano, 2006; 
Kim, 2014; Bang, 2010; Constantini and Gracceva, 2004). Both developed and developing 
countries have been working to identify ways of minimizing the vulnerability of their energy sector 
to internal and external risks. For many countries energy security has become an important pillar 
among their national policy targets because a continuous supply of energy is necessary for the 
growth of the economy. Hence, there have been many attempts to conceptualize, define and 
quantify energy security. However, it is impossible to provide a universal definition of energy 
security, as each definition depends on the people and countries, the types of threats to energy 
security, the social and economic response of countries, and the time period (Alhajji, 2007), hence 
there is no consensus on the definition of energy security (Ang et al., 2015). Some studies focused 
exclusively of the security of energy supply in importing countries (Andrews-Speed, 2004;, Bahgat, 
2007, etc.), highlighting the importance of availability and prices of energy (Spanjer, 2008; Jamasb 
and Pollitt, 2008), while other studies included aspects such as the effects on social and economic 
welfare of energy security risks (Vivoda, 2010). Very few studies, such as Platts (2012) and Marcel 
(2006), focused on the security of energy demand from the perspective of the exporting countries. 
Security of demand is a concern for exporting countries, as a reduction in energy demand 
significantly affects revenues from energy exports, as is the case with oil exporting countries such 
as Saudi Arabia and Russia. Security of domestic energy supply has also become a concern in 
several energy exporting countries. As they are facing a growing domestic energy demand, one of 
their focuses is to ensure the availability of domestic supply in order to meet the domestic growing 
demand, before any energy exportation. This has been the case in the African electricity market 
with exporting countries such as Ghana. Again, few studies, such as Yafimava (2011), focused on 
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the security of the transportation and transit of energy to some countries. Transit countries are 
used by several exporting and importing countries when transporting energy. The absence of 
violence and terrorism in these countries as well as their political stability matter for safe 
transportation and transit of energy supply. Energy security in this study will be mostly analyzed 
from the supply side perspective.  
Throughout the literature, most studies which attempt to define the security of energy supply can 
generally be classified in three main groups. The first group comprises studies which consider 
security as an interrupted supply of energy commodities. One of the tenants of such definition is 
the United Kingdom (UK)’s Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). According to 
DECC (2009, p. 19): “Secure energy means that the risks of interruption to energy supply, are low”. 
Other tenants of such definition of energy security include studies such as Ölz, Sims and Kirchner 
(2007), Scheepers. Seebregts, de Jong and Maters (2007), Wright (2005), Hoogeveen and Perlot 
(2007), and Lieb-Dóczy, Börner and MacKerron (2003). A few studies (Billinton and Allan, 1996); 
Makarov and Moharari, 1999) among the first group introduced the notion of “reliability” to explain 
the concept of “low interruption risks” stated in the DECC’s (2009) definition of energy security. 
According to these studies, the “reliability” of an energy system implies two sub-concepts: 
“security” and “adequacy”. An energy system is considered to be secured if it is able to remain 
unaffected by risks, and it is considered to be adequate if it is able to ensure consumers’ energy 
needs at any time. Unlike DECC (2009), Billinton and Allan (1996) and Makarov and Moharari 
(1999), in their framework on “reliability” do not define energy security as a state of “low 
interruption risks”, rather, they define energy security as the ability of an energy system to resist 
risks or adapt to change. While there are slight differences in the definition of energy security 
among studies of the first group, their common view is that a rise in the shortage of energy can be 
interpreted as energy insecurity. 
The second group of studies differentiates between secure and insecure levels of uninterrupted 
energy supply when defining energy security. Small outages or discontinuity in the supply of 
energy are not necessarily a risk for energy security. The most known definitions of energy security 
among this group of studies are those of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP). According to IEA (2001, p. 76), “Energy security is defined 
in terms of the physical availability of supplies to satisfy demand at a given price”. IEA (2007, p. 
160) defines energy security as: “adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy”,and for IEA 
(2014, p.13) energy security is the “uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable 
price”. UNDP (2000, p. 112) argued that energy security is “the continuous availability of energy in 
varied forms, in sufficient quantities and at affordable prices”. According to the World Energy 
Council (2008, p. 1), energy security is “an uninterruptible supply of energy, in terms of quantities 
required to meet demand at affordable prices”. Such definitions imply that in addition to 
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interruptions of the energy supply, increases in energy prices above a certain threshold are also 
considered as energy security risks. However, increases in energy prices below such thresholds 
are not considered as energy security risks. A significant number of studies aligns with IEA’s 
definitions such as Andrews (2005), Vicini, Gracceva, Markandya and Costantini (2005), Yergin 
(1988), Luciani (2004), Jun, Kim and Chang (2009), Le Coq and Paltseva (2009), Fondazione Eni 
Enrico Mattei (FEEM) (2008). Another definition of energy security among this group is that of 
Mabro (2008, p. 3) who stated the following: “Security is impaired when supplies are reduced or 
interrupted in some places to an extent that causes a sudden, significant and sustained increase in 
prevailing prices”. His definition implies that interruptions of energy supply can be considered as an 
energy security risk only if increases in energy prices are beyond a certain threshold. Other studies 
in the second group included in their definition the occurrence of a predictable or unexpected event 
which can determine energy security. Significant among these are McCarthy, Ogden and Sperling 
(2007), Rutherford Scharpf and Carrington (2007) and Spanjer (2007). While most studies of the 
second group agree on the differentiation between secure and insecure levels of energy supply, 
they diverge in their identification of a common secured quantity energy supply because secure 
and insecure levels of energy supply vary from one country to another. A secure level of energy 
supply in one country can be considered insecure in another country. 
Within the third group of studies, first, some studies extended the definition of energy security to 
the impact on the ability to provide energy services. Their definition of energy security is more 
focused on the potential impact of energy disruption on the availability of energy services. 
Significant among them are Patterson (2008), Noel and Findlater (2010), and Li (2005). Findlater 
and Noel (2010, p. 2) on gas supply security stated the following: “security of gas supply (or gas 
supply security) refers to the ability of a country’s energy supply system to meet final contracted 
energy demand in the event of a gas supply disruption”. Their statement implies that disruption of 
gas supply may or may not necessarily affect the continuity of gas services such as heating, 
cooking, etc. Other studies within the third group extended the definition of energy security to the 
impact on the economy of a country. Significant among these are Bohi, Toman and Walls (1996), 
Joode, Kingma, Lijesen and Shestalova (2004), Grubb, Butler and Twomey (2006) and Lefèvre 
(2010). The most comprehensive is Bohi et al. (1996) who defined energy insecurity as reductions 
in welfare that may arise because of variation in the availability or the price of energy. This 
definition implies that changes in the price or availability of energy may or may not necessarily 
affect the economy; in addition, the economic impact of energy disruptions varies from one type of 
energy to another. Finally, a number of studies within the third group extended the definition of 
energy security to the impact on the environment. Significant among these are Verrastro and 
Ladislaw (2007), the study of the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) (2007), European 
Commission (2000), and Kruyt, van Vuuren, de Vries and Groenenberg (2009). APERC (2007, p. 
6) define energy security as: “the ability of an economy to guarantee the availability of energy 
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resource supply in a sustainable and timely manner with the energy price being at a level that will 
not adversely affect the economic performance of the economy”. 
The differentiation between secure and insecure levels of energy supply and the inclusion of 
impacts on energy services, the economy and the environment make the definition of energy 
security very inclusive. However, such inclusiveness is also a disadvantage as it makes the 
concept of energy security difficult to measure. Although there is no consensus on a unique 
definition of energy security, all definitions agree on the idea that energy security implies avoiding 
risks which can lead to an interruption of the supply of energy services, and leave the demand 
unmet. Such interruption of energy supply varies according to the country, the risk context and the 
energy type. Hence, it is worth indicating that each country has its own energy security risks and 
energy security risks vary according to the type of energy. This study will specifically focus on the 
sustainable security of electricity supply in the Beninese context. 
In Benin, electricity supply security risk is mainly related to the inability to cope with sudden 
disruptions of electricity supply. First, the country has a high dependency on importation of 
electricity: according to the US EIA (2017), in 2015 around 77.575% of its electricity was imported 
from neighbouring countries. Hence, the Beninese electricity sector is affected by any outages of 
electricity supply which occur in its neighbouring countries (exporting countries). Second, the 
country relies heavily on oil for its domestic electricity generation: according to the World 
Development Indicators (2017), in 2014 Benin relied on oil to generate 99.45% of its domestic 
electricity, while the country is not an oil exporter. This high dependency on oil exposes the 
electricity sector to fluctuations in oil prices. High oil prices constitute a limitation to the country’s 
capacity to generate electricity domestically because they increase electricity production costs. In 
addition, oil, as any other fossil fuel energy, is a limited and non-renewable resource. In the 
perspective of long-run and sustainable energy security, countries should include in their energy 
mix an important share of sustainable energy resources such as renewable energy. Increases of 
the share of renewable electricity in the total domestic generation of electricity will therefore 
contribute to sustainable electricity supply security. In the case of Benin, however, only 5.55% of 
the electricity generated domestically came from renewable sources in 2015, and the generation of 
electricity based on renewable sources has never exceeded such amount over the period 1996-
2015. This indicates that in 2015, 94.45% of the electricity generated domestically in Benin came 
from non-renewable sources. Therefore the sustainability of Benin’s domestic electricity production 
becomes a concern. 
Third, the Beninese electricity sector encounters high quantity of technical and non-technical 
electricity losses: according to the US EIA (2017), 19.358% of the electricity supply was lost during 
transmission and distribution in 2015. These losses constitute a reduction in the quantity of 
electricity supply available for consumers.  
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In the context of the Beninese electricity sector, electricity security risks can therefore be defined 
as exposure of electricity supply to electricity losses, foreign outages of electricity due to high 
dependency on electricity importation, and fluctuations in the price of oil which is a limited and non-
renewable energy resource. Losses of electricity, heavy dependency on importation of electricity, 
heavy dependency on oil/fossil fuel (a non-renewable energy resource for domestic electricity 
generation) therefore constitute three major indicators of the vulnerability of the Beninese electricity 
sector. For this study, four additional indicators will be added. The first is a governance index. The 
“control of corruption” in a country, the “rule of law”, the “quality of the regulatory system”, the 
“political stability and absence of violence”, and “government effectiveness”, represent governance 
indicators (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2017) which influence the effectiveness of the 
delivery of electricity to consumers. The governance index comprises these governance indicators, 
and each indicator has been converted to positive values by adding 100 for ease of calculation of 
the index; further explanation is provided in the methodology,section 2.4.1.  
The second is the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to the growth of the 
urbanization rate. Urbanization rate is defined as the share of the population that lives in urban 
areas, and is expressed as a percentage of total population. For ease of comparison between 
growth of the urbanization rate and growth of urban access to electricity, this ratio has been 
transformed into a ratio with solely positive values by adding 100% to both numerator and 
denominator (further explanation is provided in the methodology, section 2.4.1); we also multiply 
the transformed ratio by 100 in order to have all its values as percentages. As reported by IEA 
(2016), rapid urbanization increases energy consumption; in 2013, cities accounted for 64% of the 
world’s use of primary energy. Other studies, such as Sheng, He and Guo (2017) on 78 countries 
and Jones (1991) on 59 developing countries, also established that urbanization increases energy 
consumption. Urbanization increases the demand for energy and if the supply of energy is unable 
to meet the demand, then energy shortages occur. In other words, urbanization must go along with 
urban access to electricity/energy in order to avoid disruption of the supply of energy, including 
electricity. The ratio of the rate of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to the rate of growth 
of urbanization compares the urbanization speed to the speed of urban access to electricity. It 
measures the ability of countries to meet the increases in electricity demand caused by 
urbanization, by increasing urban access to electricity. On one hand, if this ratio is less than 100, it 
indicates that urbanization is growing faster than urban access to electricity. This situation can 
result in electricity supply disruption in urban areas, as the urban supply of electricity may not be 
able to meet the urban demand for electricity. On the other hand, if this ratio is greater than 100, it 
indicates that urban access to electricity is growing faster than urbanization. Therefore, promoting 
urban access to electricity can help cities to meet their growing electricity demand.  
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The third is the rate of access to electricity, which is defined as the ratio of the population that has 
access to electricity to the total population. For the purpose of simplicity it will be expressed as a 
percentage. A rate below 100 indicates that the country has a supply gap as there is a proportion 
of its population that does not have access to electricity. In other words, a proportion of the 
population is left without electricity and therefore is facing a total disruption of electricity. A value 
equal to 100 indicates that the entire population of the country has access to electricity and there is 
no supply gap. Promoting access to electricity can enable a country to minimize the electricity 
supply gap or total disruption of electricity supply. 
The fourth is real GDP per capita (expressed as a percentage of the world annual average real 
GDP per capita; further explanation is provided in the conceptual framework on electricity supply 
security and the methodology, sections 2.2.2 and 2.4.1 respectively). It highlights how wealthy the 
country is, and indicates the country’s ability to avoid or prevent disruptions of electricity supply by 
investing in electricity infrastructure and utilities. A country with high GDP per capita is financially 
more able to invest in electricity utilities in order to reduce or avoid supply disruptions than a 
country with low GDP per capita. As argued by Ferguson et al. (2000), a positive correlation exists 
between countries’ wealth and their electricity consumption.  
The aim of this study is to build a composite index of electricity supply security risks, which account 
for the three major indicators of the vulnerability of the Beninese electricity sector as described 
above (losses of electricity, heavy dependency on importation of electricity, and heavy dependency 
on oil/fossil fuel), plus the governance index, the transformed ratio of growth of access to electricity 
in urban areas to growth of the urbanization rate, the rate of access to electricity, and real GDP per 
capita (expressed as a percentage of the world annual average real GDP per capita). However we 
first provide a framework to explain the dimensions of energy supply security in general and the 
dimensions of electricity supply security in particular. 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENERGY AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SECURITY 
2.2.1  Conceptual framework for energy supply security 
The definitions of energy security have evolved over time according to the context and the types of 
exposure to energy risks. According to Chevalier (2006), IEA (2007), APERC (2007), and CIEP 
(2004), four main pillars (“the four As”) characterize energy security: The first is the “availability” of 
energy. This implies the physical existence of energy resources in an economy or a country. 
Losses of energy/electricity supply reduce the quantity of energy available for consumers. Rapid 
urbanization without a sound plan to promote urban access to energy will cause a supply gap of 
energy in urban areas. Lack of access to energy/electricity by a proportion of the population in a 
country is due to a supply gap. The second pillar is “accessibility”. In many countries, production 
and consumption of energy occur in separate places. Many countries have to import energy from 
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places where there is political instability, or other geopolitical issues. Although energy might be 
available to be imported, it may not be easily accessible. On the other hand, energy may be 
available in a country, but access to such energy by domestic consumers can be a challenge 
within that country if there are governance issues (corruption, lack of rule of law, poor quality of the 
regulatory system, political instability and violence) which affect the delivery of energy to 
consumers. The third pillar is the “affordability” of energy. Although energy might be available and 
accessible, it may not be easy to purchase it at an affordable price. In the oil industry, affordability 
of energy is a concern for importing countries, as oil prices are often volatile. Affordability can also 
be interpreted as a country’s financial ability to invest in energy infrastructure and provide energy 
utilities services in order to prevent or avoid supply disruption of energy among its population. 
Countries that have a high GDP per capita are considered wealthy and able to achieve such a 
goal, while countries that have low GDP per capita lack the necessary financial resources to 
enable them to achieve such a goal. “Affordability” is therefore an important aspect of energy 
security. The fourth pillar is “acceptability”, which indicates the acceptability of the energy types by 
society (the production or consumption of such energies should not cause heavy environmental 
damage to society), and the sustainability of the energies produced or consumed. The production 
and consumption of many energy types affect the environment. For instance, production and 
consumption of oil/fossil fuel energy pollute the environment by generating CO2 emissions in the 
atmosphere. The generation of electricity using oil also pollutes the atmosphere with CO2 
emissions, and CO2 emissions in the atmosphere are one of the climate change issues. Hence, 
many countries are concerned about producing and consuming energy without damaging the 
environment significantly. As explained previously, oil and other types of fossil fuel are limited and 
non-renewable energy resources. Long-term and sustainable production of electricity/energy 
implies the use of sustainable energy resources, such as renewable energy. Ellabban, Abu-Rub, 
and Blaabjerg (2014, p. 749) defined renewable energy as: “energy sources that are continually 
replenished by nature and derived directly from the sun (such as thermal, photo-chemical, and 
photo-electric), indirectly from the sun (such as wind, hydropower, and photosyntheticenergystored 
in biomass), or from other natural movements and mechanisms of the environment (such as 
geothermal and tidal energy)”. The World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) 
defined sustainable development as a development which satisfies the needs of  the current 
generation without jeopardizing future generation’s capability to satisfy their own needs. 
Renewable energies are unlimited and their stock will still be available for future generations as 
they can be renewed. Therefore, increases in the share of renewable energy in the total domestic 
production of energy matters for a sustainable energy supply security.  
While previously-mentioned studies have characterized energy security according to concepts of 
“availability”, “accessibility”, “affordability” and “acceptability”, IEA (2007) distinguishes between 
long- and short-run security of energy supply. Short-run energy security refers to the ability to avoid 
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interruptions of energy supply, while long-run energy security refers to structural patterns of the 
energy sector, and the causes of energy supply interruptions. The lack of long-term investments to 
increase energy supply will lead to short-term interruptions of energy supply in the future. 
Although the concepts of “availability”, “accessibility”, “affordability” and “acceptability” have been 
identified as the four pillars of energy security, their importance will evolve over time and according 
to the context. On one hand, in a world where globalization, multilateralism and market cooperation 
are the pattern, the issue of energy dependence of one region on another will not matter, as 
geopolitical issues will be easily solved. The focus will rather be the existence of a sufficient 
quantity of energy resources and their production costs. In other words, the focus will be on the 
concepts of “availability” and “affordability”. Conversely, in a world where regionalization and 
political barriers are the pattern, geopolitical issues will matter. The focus will be on energy 
independence, as access to energy in politically unstable zones will be an issue. The attention will 
therefore be on the concept of “accessibility”. 
On the other hand, in a world where sustainable development and climate change issues matter 
and where the production and consumption of energy that has low environmental damage is 
encouraged, the cost of energy may rise, as there is a tradeoff between targeting environmental 
goals and low energy cost. Solving such tradeoff will require more innovation in science and 
technology to reduce the production costs of environmentally safe energy. This will take time. 
Hence, in such world the focus will be on the concepts of “acceptability” and “affordability”.  
2.2.2  Conceptual framework for electricity supply security (electricity supply disruption 
risks) 
As said in previous sections, the focus in this study is on sustainable electricity supply security, 
precisely on electricity supply disruption risks. The attention is on both short- and long-run security. 
Long-term and sustainable electricity security take into account the ability of countries to rely more 
on renewable energy resources when producing electricity and to be less dependent on 
importation of electricity. Renewable energy resources are unlimited, while fossil fuel energy 
resources used in many countries for the production of electricity are limited. In addition, there are 
always uncertainties related to dependency on importation of electricity. For instance, Ghana is a 
politically stable country and has been exporting electricity to Benin and Togo for decades. 
However, because of natural disasters such as droughts which have reduced the level of water in 
the Akossombo dam of and limited its capacity to produce electricity, Ghana was constrained in 
1983, 1994 and 2004 to reduce its export of electricity to Benin and Togo. Therefore, even in the 
absence of geopolitical issues there are still uncertainties which can affect countries’ importation of 
electricity. Because of this, this study considers dependency on importation of electricity as one of 
the sources of risks for electricity security in both the short and the long run. Countries that are 
self-sufficient in terms of their domestic electricity supply are not exposed to uncertainties related 
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to importation of electricity. They may be exposed to uncertainties related to fluctuation of the 
international demand for electricity if they are exporters. Security of electricity demand is not the 
focus of this study; rather the focus is on the supply side of electricity security.  
The analysis of electricity supply security will be based on the four pillars of energy security 
mentioned previously (“the four As”). The security risks related to these traditional four pillars have 
been proxied by a variety of indicators. First, on one hand, the electricity security risk related to the 
concept of “accessibility” can be proxied by either the share of net imports of electricity in the total 
domestic supply of electricity, or the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency. Such rate is defined 
as the ratio of electricity not imported to total domestic supply of electricity, while the share of net 
imports of electricity is defined as the ratio of net imports of electricity to total domestic supply of 
electricity. Because of the negative values of net imports of electricity for exporting countries, and 
because we will be using a geometric mean to calculate the electricity supply disruption risk index 
(all numbers must have the same sign, when taking their geometric mean, further explanation is 
provided in the methodology, section 2.4.1), the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency has been 
chosen as a proxy for security risk related to the concept of “accessibility”. Such rate reflects 
countries’ ability to be self-sufficient in terms of their domestic electricity supply. It also points out 
the self-sufficiency gap, in other words the dependency on importation of electricity (in countries 
that import electricity). A value of such rate below 100 indicates that the country has a deficit of 
electricity supply and is dependent on importation of electricity. A value equal to 100 indicates that 
the country has no electricity supply deficit or is self-sufficient in terms of its domestic electricity 
supply, and a value above 100 indicates that the country has a surplus of electricity supply, in other 
words, the country is self-sufficient in terms of its domestic electricity supply, and exports its 
surplus of electricity. Such rate highlights the exposure of importing countries to outages and 
shortages of electricity occurring in exporting countries. The political stability of exporting countries 
also matters for easy importation of electricity. It is one of the causes of sudden reductions in 
exports of electricity within exporting countries, and can be considered as one of the indicators 
related to the concept of accessibility. However, because of lack of data on exporting countries and 
the countries to which they supply electricity, the political stability of exporting countries has not 
been included as a proxy for electricity security risks related to the concept of “accessibility”. In 
addition the political stability of exporting countries highlights exclusively the risks related to access 
to electricity by importing countries: it does not provide any information on the degree of countries’ 
dependency on importation of electricity. A country can rely heavily on importation of electricity 
while its supplier countries are politically stable. In this case, there is no risk related to political 
stability, but there is a risk related to high import dependency, because exporting countries also 
face a growing domestic demand for electricity, and they can suddenly reduce their exports of 
electricity in order to meet their growing domestic demand for electricity. This has been the case 
with Ghana, a politically stable country which has suddenly reduced its exportation of electricity to 
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Benin and Togo. This situation has been the causes of electricity shortages in Benin and Togo. 
The self-sufficiency rate in terms of domestic electricity supply or the proportion of imported 
electricity highlights in the case of Benin the exposure of the country to sudden reductions, outages 
and shortages of electricity occurring in its supplier countries such as Ghana. 
On the other hand, the electricity security risk related to the concept of “accessibility” can also be 
proxied by the quality of governance within a country. As explained previously, the effectiveness of 
the delivery of electricity to consumers within a country can be influenced by the quality of 
governance prevailing in such a country. The effectiveness of the delivery of electricity to 
consumers influences consumers’ accessibility to electricity. Consequently, the quality of the 
governance within a country influences consumers’ accessibility to electricity. Five governance 
indicators (“control of corruption”, “rule of law”, “quality of the regulatory system”, “political stability 
and absence of violence”, and “government effectiveness”) (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
2017) have been identified to construct a composite governance index which will be used as a 
proxy for the concept of “accessibility”. 
Second, on one hand, the electricity security risks related to the concept of “availability” can be 
proxied either by the share of electricity losses in the total supply, or by the rate of electricity 
efficiency. The rate of electricity efficiency is the ratio of the quantity of electricity that is not lost to 
the total supply of electricity, while the share of losses of electricity in the total supply of electricity 
is the ratio of the electricity lost to the total supply of electricity. Losses of electricity reduce the 
available quantity of electricity generated, and they can be technical or non-technical. Non-
technical losses are mostly due to human behaviours such as thefts of electricity, etc. Technical 
losses are related to the technology used for the transmission and distribution of electricity. 
Countries should try to invest in electricity-efficient technology for transmission and distribution. 
The rate of electricity efficiency has been chosen as a proxy for the concept of “availability”: it 
highlights countries’ ability to reduce the losses of electricity, and it also points out the electricity 
efficiency gap, in other words the proportion of losses of electricity in the total supply.  
On the other hand, the electricity security risks related to the concept of “availability” can also be 
proxied by the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to the growth of the 
urbanization rate, or the rate of access to electricity. As mentioned previously, for ease of 
comparison between the growth of the urbanization rate and the growth of urban access to 
electricity, the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to growth of the urbanization 
rate has been transformed (further explanation is provided in the methodology, section 2.4.1). As 
reported by IEA (2016), Sheng et al. (2017) on 78 countries, and Jones (1991) on 59 developing 
countries, urbanization increases energy consumption. As explained previously, if countries fail to 
promote urban access to electricity, the available supply of electricity in urban areas may not be 
able to meet the urban demand. Consequently, a supply disruption of electricity may occur in urban 
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areas. As said before, the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to growth of the 
urbanization rate compares the speed of urban access to electricity to the speed of urbanization 
expressed as a percentage. If the value is less than 100, it indicates that the available urban 
supply of electricity may not be able to meet the demand. Conversely, if its value is greater than or 
equal to 100, it indicates that promoting urban access to electricity can help to satisfy the increased 
demand for electricity caused by urbanization. The rate of access to electricity indicates the 
existence or not of a supply gap in the country. As said previously, it is defined as the proportion of 
the total population that has access to electricity. In other words, it is the ratio of the population that 
has access to electricity to the total population. If the rate of access to electricity is less than 100%, 
this indicates that a proportion of the population does not have access to electricity. This situation 
is due to a supply gap, and indicates that the available electricity in the country is not enough to 
satisfy the electricity needs of the entire population and the country does not have enough financial 
resources to provide full access to electricity to its entire population. For the proportion of the 
population that does not have access to electricity, this situation is comparable to a total and 
continual disruption of electricity supply. Conversely, if the rate of access to electricity is equal to 
100%, this indicates that the entire population of the country has access to electricity. In other 
words, there is no electricity supply gap or none of the population is facing a total and continual 
disruption of electricity supply. A country with a high rate of access to electricity has a smaller 
supply gap of electricity to fill while a country with a low rate has a high supply gap to fill. The rate 
of access to electricity is therefore a decreasing function of electricity supply gap. In other words, it 
is a decreasing function of a total and continual disruption of electricity. Increasing access to 
electricity will contribute to reduce supply gap of electricity or total disruption of electricity supply. 
Third, following APERC (2007), we will use the share of renewable electricity in total domestic 
production of electricity as a proxy of the electricity security risks related to the concept of 
“acceptability”. APERC (2007) argued that the share of renewable and nuclear energy in the total 
supply of energy can be used as an indicator for the concept of acceptability. It represents the 
“share of zero carbon fuel” in the total fuel supply and is considered as countries’ efforts to 
increase their use of low carbon intensive energy and decrease their use of high carbon intensive 
energy. It also represents countries’ efforts to have sustainable sources of electricity production. As 
said previously, renewable energies are unlimited energy resources, while fossil fuels are limited 
energy resources. For the sustainability of their energy supply security, countries should increase 
the share of sustainable energy resources such as renewable energy in their total energy supply. 
Gnansounou (2008) argued that increasing the share of renewable electricity in the total supply is 
one of the ways of diversifying the sources of electricity generation. Hence, the share of renewable 
electricity in the total domestic production of electricity can also be considered as an indicator of 
diversification of sources of electricity generation. In alignment with Gnansounou (2008), Kruyt et 
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al. (2009) stipulated that a diversity of sources of energy supply enables countries to mitigate risks 
related to physical disruption of supply. 
Fourth, the electricity security risks related to the concept of “affordability” can be proxied by the 
price of electricity or the share of electricity expenditures in real GDP, or real GDP per capita. Real 
GDP per capita indicates countries’ ability to improve the standard of living of their population by 
investing in electricity infrastructure and providing utility services such as electricity to their 
populations with the purpose of preventing or avoiding supply disruption of electricity among these 
populations. As mentioned before, Ferguson et al. (2000) argued that there is a positive correlation 
between countries’ wealth and their energy consumption. Countries that have high real GDP per 
capita are more financially capable of investing in electricity infrastructure and utilities in order to 
avoid disruption of electricity supply among their populations, while countries that have low real 
GDP per capita are less financially capable of achieving such goals. Real GDP per capita is 
therefore an increasing function of countries’ financial ability to finance electricity infrastructure or 
utilities services in order to prevent or avoid disruption of electricity supplies. For the purpose of 
simplicity and in order to avoid having an indicator with very high numerical range, real GDP per 
capita is expressed in this study as a percentage of the world annual average real GDP per capita. 
Kendell and James (1998) argued that energy expenditures are an indicator of energy affordability. 
Their rationale is that high energy expenditures indicate that a country has some difficulties in 
supplying energy. They recommend using the share of energy expenditures in income. The US 
EIA (2018) has also used the share of energy expenditures in GDP to highlight the importance of 
energy in the economies of the United States and other countries. Economies for which the share 
of energy expenditures in GDP is high are more vulnerable to increases in energy prices, because 
the increase in energy costs resulting from increases in energy prices is significant. Because of 
lack of data on electricity prices in Benin and many other African countries, the concept of 
affordability with electricity prices cannot be proxied in this study. Rather, in alignment with Kendell 
and James (1998), either the ratio of the total cost of electricity supply to real GDP or the share of 
real GDP which is not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply (which is equal to total real 
GDP minus the share of real GDP dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply) will be used. 
The ratio of the total cost of electricity supply to real GDP highlights the proportion of real GDP 
dedicated to cover the cost related to electricity supply. On one hand, a high proportion of real 
GDP dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply indicates that supplying electricity is very 
costly for the country, and affordability of electricity by the country may become an issue if there 
are some unpredicted negative shocks to real GDP. This situation can result in a limited capacity 
for the country to purchase electricity: consequently supply disruption can occur. On the other 
hand, a low proportion of real GDP dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply indicates that 
supplying electricity is not very costly. In other words, electricity is affordable by the country. In the 
same way, if the share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply is high, this 
13 
 
indicates that supplying electricity is not very costly, and is affordable by the country. However, if 
the share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply is low, this indicates that 
supplying electricity is very costly for the country, and affordability of electricity by the country may 
become an issue if unpredicted negative shocks affect real GDP. Such a situation can result in 
disruption of electricity supply in the country. Between these two indicators (ratio of the total cost of 
electricity supply to real GDP and the share of real GDP which is not dedicated to cover the cost of 
electricity supply), this study uses the share of real GDP which is not dedicated to cover the cost of 
electricity supply as a proxy for the concept of “affordability”.  
Based on these four pillars of energy security and the proxies used as indicators of electricity 
security risks, the following framework of electricity security (Figure 2.1) has been designed to 
depict a composite index of electricity supply disruption risks. Before describing the procedure 
used for the construction of such composite index, it is important to review past studies on energy 
security indicators and indexes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Summary of conceptual framework for electricity supply security 
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Source: Author’s own conceptualization based on Chevalier (2005), IEA (2007), APERC (2007), 
and CIEP (2004) 
2.3  review of past studies on energy security indicators and indexes 
Throughout the literature, there have been several studies which have attempted to measure 
energy security. Some have analyzed only one aspect of energy security, while others have 
attempted to measure several aspects using either an aggregated or a disaggregated indicator. 
Although many of these indicators have attempted to quantify one or several aspects of energy 
security, most of them have been designed based on a certain context, and they are subject to 
improvement or change as contexts evolve.  
2.3.1  Studies on disaggregated indicators of energy security 
First, the availability or physical existence of energy is important for the security of the energy 
supply. As a result, the “resources estimates” has been used as an indicator of the availability of 
energy. However, there are issues related to the available quantity of hydrocarbon resources and 
their possible extraction. Among the few studies which attempted to estimate fossil fuel resources, 
the United States Geological Survey (USGS, 2000) is the most comprehensive. While some 
studies, such as Mulders, Hettelaar and van Bergen (2006), argued that USGS (2000) is the most 
reliable source for energy resource estimates, other studies, such as Greene,Hopson and Li 
(2005), highlighted the limitations of the USGS (2000) in measuring energy estimates. Hence there 
is a lack of consensus among studies with regard to the measurement of available resources. 
Second, as stipulated by Feygin and Satkin (2004), the reserves to production ratios (R/P ratios or 
RPRs) has been used as an indicator of security of energy supply in several studies. It can also be 
defined as the remaining years of production considering the current speed, quantity or level of 
production. This indicator is highly dependent on time, as both existing reserves and production of 
energy resources are not static but evolve over time.  
Third, another indicator of energy security that has been used is the “diversity index”. The most 
comprehensive studies which explained the concept of diversity in the context of energy security, 
are the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) (2007), Jansen, van Arkel and Boots (2004) 
and IEA (2004, 2007). Jansen et al. (2004) and APERC (2007) argued that a diversity of energy 
types and geographical location of production and importation of energy will contribute to reduce 
energy security risks related to supply. According to IEA (2004, 2007), a diversity of energy 
suppliers is a way of reducing energy security risks related to market power. A diversity index is 
therefore a quantitative measurement of either the diversity of energy types and sources of 
production or the diversity of energy suppliers. Stirling (1999) stipulated that a diversity index 
comprises three aspects. One aspect, called the “variety”, is defined as the “number of categories”. 
Another aspect, called the “balance”, is defined as “the spread across categories”. A third aspect, 
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called the “disparity”, is defined as “the degree to which categories are different from each other”. 
In practice, measuring aspects related to disparity are very challenging, hence most diversity 
indexes focus on aspects of “variety” and “balance”. One of the limitations of diversity indexes as 
indicators of energy security is that they do not capture risks related to each energy type. Each 
type of energy carries different types of risks. Risks related to electricity supply are not exactly the 
same as risks related to gas or oil supply. In addition, diversification of energy types, sources and 
suppliers will not necessarily prevent physical disruption of energy supply. Prices shocks can occur 
as a result of unexpected geopolitical issues or natural disasters, and can be transmitted from one 
energy market to another and this can lead to physical disruption of an energy supply. 
Fourth, another indicator of energy security that has often been used is “import dependency”, 
which can be measured for total energy as well as disaggregate energy, and is expressed in 
monetary form or as a percentage of total or disaggregate energy consumption. In the oil sector, 
for instance, the total oil imported relative to total oil consumption can be used to indicate “import 
dependency” (Alhajji and Williams, 2003). Because some countries import and export oil, gas 
and/or electricity, it is important to use net imports in the calculation of the “import dependency” 
indicator. Net import is obtained after subtracting exports from imports. Net imports reflect 
accurately the “import dependency” of the economy in terms of energy. APERC (2007) improved 
the “import dependency” indicator by including some diversity aspects: it used an adapted version 
of the Shanon index to measure both the import dependency and the energy diversity of an 
economy. In a context of mutual dependency in terms of energy, the international trade of energy, 
or the energy traded globally, can be used as indicators of mutual dependency. As said in the 
previous section, in a context of globalization and cooperation, an “import dependency” indicator 
will not matter, as there will be fewer barriers to importation of energy. Conversely, in a context of 
regionalization, an “import dependency” indicator will matter, as there will be political and economic 
barriers to importation of energy. 
Fifth, another indicator of energy security widely used is the “political stability” of supplier countries. 
In many countries, the government directly oversees the supply of energy or regulates the energy 
market. A stable government and fair regulations matter for both importing and exporting countries. 
Political instability, such as military coups, can affect the energy trade between countries. Some 
studies such as IEA (2007) used an average of two of the World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (2018) – “regulatory quality” and “political stability and absence of violence and 
terrorism” – to calculate the “political stability” score of each country. Other studies such as Jansen 
et al. (2004) calculated the long-term social and political risk of each country using UNDP 
indicators such as the Human Development Index.  
Sixth, another indicator of energy security that has been used is energy price. This is an 
expression of energy supply as related to energy demand or vice versa. Energy prices balance 
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supply and demand, and they are also an indication of economic impact. A reduction in oil prices 
affects the economy of countries whose production systems are not diversified and whose main 
export is oil. Energy prices can also indicate the scarcity of energy resources. However, Kruyt et al. 
(2009) argued that there are some limitations when using energy prices as an indicator of energy 
security: in the oil sector, for instance, oil prices can be influenced by speculation. 
Seventh, another indicator of energy security is the “Mean Variance Portfolio” (MVP) which is often 
used in contexts of diversification of energy generation sources. The MVP is used for optimization 
of different investment options according to their costs and risks. It is often used to assess the 
financial viability of electricity generating projects (Awerbuch and Berger, 2003; Awerbuch, 2006) 
and other energy projects (Lesbirel, 2004) and to predict future energy costs and risks such as 
price volatility. It accounts for the energy generating unit costs and the variance, as well as the 
correlation between energy costs. One of the advantages of using the MVP to assess the financial 
viability of energy projects is that rather than offering only one investment option for energy 
projects, it provides a cost-risk frontier (also called the “efficient frontier”) beyond which the cost of 
investing in energy projects cannot be reduced without increasing the uncertainties and risks, and 
the uncertainties and risks related to energy projects cannot be reduced without increasing the 
investment costs. In a context of energy insecurity and necessity to diversify the sources of energy 
generation, the use of the MPV helps to analyze different energy diversification options according 
to their financial costs, and to predict future energy security risks and their associated costs. One 
of the limitations of the MVP is that it uses past data on energy costs to predict future energy prices 
and risks. As argued by Stirling (1999), in a context where there is no information on the future, 
there is no evidence that future patterns will be similar to past patterns. 
Eighth, another indicator of energy security is the “share of zero-carbon fuels”, which has been 
used by APERC as an indicator of “acceptability”. The aim was to measure countries’ efforts to 
transition their energy mix portofolio from carbon intensive to non-carbon intensive. APERC (2007) 
uses the share of nuclear and renewable energy in the total supply of primary energy as a proxy 
for such indicator. However, concerns about the acceptability of nuclear energy have been raised 
and therefore APERC’s (2007) approach to proxy the “share of zero-carbon fuels” is still 
questionable.  
Ninth, another indicator of energy security is “market liquidity”, which is related to price elasticity. It 
is the ability of markets to adapt to fluctuation in demand and supply of energy. IEA (2004) defines 
“market liquidity” as the exponential function of the ratio of total energy consumption to total 
available energy on the market. In stock markets, Datar (2000) suggested proxying “market 
liquidity” by a “coefficient of elasticity of trading (CET)”, which is defined as the ratio of the relative 
variations in volume of trade to the relative variations in price.  
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Tenth, there are some energy demand side indicators which are relevant to security of energy 
supply as they help to measure the magnitude and impacts of disruption in energy supply. Among 
them are “energy intensity”, “energy consumption per capita”, and the “share of energy used”. 
“Energy intensity” is defined as the ratio of total energy consumption to GDP, while “energy 
consumption per capita” is defined as the ratio of total energy consumption to total population. The 
“share of energy used” indicates the proportion of energy used in a sector. If a sector uses high 
proportions of a particular energy type, this indicates that that sector is highly dependent on that 
energy type to function. For instance the share of oil used in the transportation sector is important 
and indicates the dependency of the sector on oil. In addition to these three indicators, Kendell and 
James (1998) included “energy expenditures”, another demand side indicator, among energy 
security indicators. Although it is a demand side indicator, it can be used to highlight risks related 
to disruption of the energy supply. The rationale is that high energy expenditures in a country imply 
that it faces great difficulties in supplying energy, and disruption of energy supply can occur. 
2.3.2  Studies on aggregated indicators (indexes) of energy security 
There have been several composite indexes of energy security (energy affinity index, geoeconomic 
vulnerability index, security of supply index, geopolitical energy security measure, risky external 
energy supply index, etc.), among which five are the most comprehensive. The first is Jansen et 
al.’s (2004) aggregated indicator which uses the “Shanon index” to account for diversity of energy 
types supplied and diversity among suppliers of each type of imported energy. Each supplier of an 
imported energy type is allocated a political stability weight based on a modified version of the 
UNDP Human Development Index. The rationale is that politically stable suppliers have more 
weight than those that are politically unstable. In addition to considerations of political stability, 
other aspects such as resource depletion are added to the aggregate indicator. Resource depletion 
is measured by a depletion index which is allocated to the energy-exporting countries. The 
rationale for this index is that markets will respond to a value of a ratio of reserve to production that 
falls below 50. While Jansen et al.’s (2004) aggregated indicator is related to several dimensions of 
energy security, it has some limitations. IEA (2007) argued that there is no objective basis to 
balance between resource depletion, political stability, diversity of energy types, and diversity of 
suppliers of imported energy types, and there is no objective threshold as a basis to analyze the 
reserve-to-production ratio. Moreover, the diversity of suppliers of imported energy types can 
become irrelevant in a context of globalization, as there will be fewer political barriers to imports of 
energy. 
The second is the “IEA’s energy security index” which is composed of different indicators. The first 
targets the physical availability of energy and is relevant for markets where energy prices are 
regulated. The second indicator uses a Herfindhal–Hirschman Index to evaluate market 
concentration among energy suppliers. It specifically targets risks related to energy prices. Aspects 
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related to political stability has been included to IEA’s index using two of the World Bank’s 
“worldwide governance indicators”. The limitation of the IEA’s energy security index is that there is 
no objective basis to balance between political stability and concentration of energy suppliers. In 
addition, some important aspects of energy security such as depletion of energy resources are not 
included in the construction of IEA’s energy security index.  
The third is the “supply demand index (S/D index)” developed by Scheepers et al. (2007). It is very 
comprehensive as it covers many aspects of energy security such as energy supply and demand, 
energy conversion and transportation in both long and medium run. Each aspect of energy security 
is allocated a score based on criteria such as energy efficiency, energy refinery, energy reserve, 
energy storage, sources of energy supply, etc. One of the advantages of the S/D index is that it 
accounts for demand aspect of energy security while many of the previous indexes and indicators 
do not. However, because it covers many aspects of energy security, it has become complex and 
lack transparency.  
The fourth is the “willingness to pay” developed by Bollen (2008). It is defined as the share of GDP 
a country is willing to pay in order to reduce energy security risks. It is expressed in monetary 
terms and represents the costs to pay for in order to reduce energy security risks. The rationale is 
that the higher the risks, the higher the costs to pay. The energy security risks included in Bollen’s 
(2008) “willingness to pay” are energy intensity, import dependency, and share of oil and gas in the 
total primary energy supply. One of its limitations is that some of the indicators may not be relevant 
depending on the worldview. Issues of import dependency may not be relevant in a context of 
globalization where there are fewer political barriers to importation of electricity. 
The fifth is the “oil vulnerability index” of Gupta (2008). This index has seven components: “ i) the 
ratio of net value of imported oil to GDP; ii) the ratio of oil consumption to GDP; iii) GDP per capita; 
iv) the proportion of oil supply in the total energy supply; v) the ratio of internal energy reserves to 
oil consumption; iv) exposure to geopolitical risks related to oil supply concentration, and vii) 
“market liquidity”. Weights were assigned to each of these indicators using a statistical tool named 
principal component analysis (PCA), and based on the covariance between indicators. The 
allocation of weights based on the PCA methodology has increased the robustness of the “oil 
vulnerability index” compared to other energy security indexes where weights are allocated without 
any objective basis. However, as with the MVP theory, the “oil vulnerability index” is criticized for 
using past values of covariance to predict future information related to the set of indicators which 
compose the oil vulnerability index.  
2.3.3  Contribution of this study 
Studies on disaggregate indicators of energy security have focused mostly on one or two particular 
pillars of energy security, hence they are very limited in terms of measuring the whole spectrum of 
energy security. Studies on aggregate indicators of energy security have accounted for several 
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pillars of energy security. However, most of them have focused on either total energy or a 
particular type of energy such as oil. To the best of the writer’s knowledge, there is no study which 
has constructed an aggregate indicator (index) of electricity security risk. This study will fill that gap 
by constructing a composite index of electricity security. It will focus essentially on security risks 
related to supply disruption of electricity in both the short and the long run. Long-run and 
sustainable electricity security is essential for countries relying heavily on non-renewable energy 
resources to produce electricity. In addition, in the long run countries aim to be self-sufficient in 
terms of electricity supply, because there are always uncertainties and risks related to dependency 
and importation of electricity. The study will not model the security risk index related to fluctuations 
in electricity demand: the electricity security risk index will be constructed only from the supply side 
perspective. A composite index of electricity supply security risk (electricity supply disruption risk) 
will be a great tool for policy makers in the assessment of the vulnerability of countries’ electricity 
supply. It will also be an important tool in the assessment of the ease of doing business in 
countries, as easy access to electricity and affordable electricity are important indicators of the 
ease of doing business in a geographic area. Finally it will add value to the body of knowledge in 
the field of energy security, as there is currently no composite index (to the best of the writer’s 
knowledge) to measure electricity supply disruption risk. 
2.4 METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1  Definition of variables  
The focus of this study is to construct a composite index of security of electricity supply, more 
precisely, a composite index of electricity supply disruption risk. As mentioned previously in the 
framework for electricity supply security, the composite index for electricity supply disruption risks 
will be constructed based on the four pillars of energy security: “accessibility”, “availability”, 
“affordability” and “acceptability”. To construct this index, a set of indicators of electricity supply 
disruption risks has been identified for each of the four pillars. The self-sufficiency rate in terms of 
electricity supply and a governance index have been identified as proxies for the concept of 
“accessibility”; the rate of electricity supply efficiency, the ratio of growth of access to electricity in 
urban areas to growth of the urbanization rate, and the rate of access to electricity have been 
identified as proxies for the concept of “availability”; the share of renewable electricity in the total 
domestic production of electricity has been identified as a proxy for the concept of “acceptability” 
(which also implies “sustainability”); and the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of 
electricity supply, and real GDP per capita (as a percentage of the world annual average GDP per 
capita) have been identified as proxies for the concept of “affordability”.  
Some of these indicators have been transformed because of the presence of negative or zero 
values in their series. First, the governance index (GI) has been transformed because the 
governance indicators used to construct it have both positive and negative values, depending on 
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the years. As the study uses a geometric mean for the calculation of the composite index of 
electricity supply security risk, all values to be used have to be of same sign. Hence, all these 
governance indicators were transformed by adding 100 to their annual value in order for them to be 
essentially positive. In this way, there are only positive values for the governance index which itself 
is the geometric mean of the governance indicators (see equation 2.1, further explanation of the 
choice of geometric mean is provided in the method section below). The governance indicators are 
provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018) and are the following: “rule of law” (RLA), 
“control of corruption” (COC), “quality of the regulatory system” (QAR), “government effectiveness” 
(GEF), “political stability and absence of violence” (POS). Each of these indicators are respectively 
an increasing function of countries’ efforts in terms of rule of law, countries’ efforts to control 
corruption, countries’ efforts to improve the quality of their regulatory system, countries’ efforts to 
improve the effectiveness of their government system, countries’ level of political stability and 
attempts to reduce violence. High values of the governance index (GI) indicate high quality of 
governance in the country, while low values of the governance index indicate low quality of the 
country’s governance. This indicates that the governance index (GI) is an increasing function of 
countries’ governance. As said previously, the quality of governance within a country influences the 
effectiveness of the delivery of electricity to consumers. Ineffective planning and mismanagement 
in the distribution of electricity can occur because of corruption, poor quality of the regulatory 
system, and political instability. This situation can result in a lack of foresight of increases in 
electricity demand and unpredicted disruptions of electricity supply. In addition, corruption and lack 
of rule of law can lead to mismanagement in the electricity billing system and thefts of electricity. 
This situation can cause non-technical losses of electricity, and can reduce the available quantity 
of electricity supplied to legal consumers, and therefore can be considered as one of the risks of 
electricity supply disruption. The governance indicator (GI) is one of the proxies for the concept of 
“accessibility” and is expressed as follows: 
 5 ( 100) ( 100) ( 100) ( 100) ( 100)                              2.1GI RLA COC QAR GEF POS         
  
Second, the ratio (RUB) of growth of access to electricity in urban areas (∆UAE) to growth of the 
urbanization rate (∆UR) measures countries’ ability to avoid an electricity supply gap caused by 
rapid urbanization. If the urbanization rate (UR) evolves more rapidly than urban access to 
electricity (UAE), then there will be a rapid increase in the urban demand for electricity which will 
not be met by the urban supply of electricity. A supply gap will occur and there will be a disruption 
of electricity supply in urban areas. If urban access to electricity (UAE) evolves more rapidly than 
the urbanization rate (UR), then promoting access to electricity in urban areas can contribute to 
preventing urban disruption of the electricity supply. The series of the ratio (RUB) of growth of 
access to electricity in urban areas (∆UAE) to growth of the urbanization rate (∆UR) also 
possesses both positive and negative values, and values that are equal to zero. As said before, the 
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study uses a geometric mean for the calculation of the electricity supply disruption risks index, and 
this requires all values to be of same sign. Hence, the number 100 has been added to both the 
numerator and the denominator of the ratio (RUB) of growth of access to electricity in urban areas 
(∆UAE) to growth of the urbanization rate (∆UR), in order for that ratio to have essentially positive 
values. High values of that ratio (RUB) indicates that countries’ effectiveness in filling the urban 
supply gap of electricity (caused by rapid urbanization) is increasing in order to contribute to 
satisfying the urban demand for electricity (also caused by urbanization). Therefore, that ratio is an 
increasing function of countries’ effectiveness in filling the urban supply gap of electricity caused by 
rapid urbanization. It is one of the proxies for the concept of “availability”, and is expressed as a 
percentage as follows: 
100
100                                                                                                                  2.2
100
UAE
RUB
UR
 
 
 
  
Third, the self-sufficiency rate in terms of domestic electricity supply (ESS), which is defined as one 
minus the ratio of net imports of electricity (NIE) to total domestic supply of electricity (TDES), has 
been used as one of the proxies for the concept of “accessibility”, instead of the share of net 
imports of electricity in the total domestic supply. The share of net imports of electricity in the total 
domestic supply possesses both positive and negative values in its series. As said previously, it is 
defined as the ratio of net imports of electricity to the total domestic supply of electricity. Net 
imports of electricity are defined as imports of electricity minus exports of electricity. Negative 
values of the share of net imports of electricity in the total domestic supply indicate that the country 
is self-sufficient in terms of domestic electricity supply, and exports its surplus of electricity. 
Positive values of the share of net imports of electricity in total domestic supply indicate that the 
country is not self-sufficient in terms of domestic electricity supply and imports electricity. A share 
of net imports of electricity in the total domestic supply that is equal to zero, simply indicates that 
the country is self-sufficient in terms of domestic electricity supply. Because the study uses a 
geometric mean for the calculation of the electricity supply disruption risk index, all values of 
indicators have to be of same sign. The share of net imports of electricity in the total domestic 
supply does not fulfill this requirement, and this is why the self-sufficiency rate in terms of domestic 
electricity supply (ESS) has been chosen as one of the proxies for the concept of “accessibility”. It 
highlights both countries’ dependency on importation of electricity and their ability to produce their 
electricity supply domestically. It is an increasing function of countries’ ability to produce their 
electricity supply domestically and a decreasing function of countries dependency on importation of 
electricity. It is expressed as a percentage as follows: 
General expression 
22 
 
1 100                                                                                                                    2.3
NIE
ESS
TDES
 
   
    
Case of importing countries 
1 100                                                                                                                2.4
NIE
ESS
ED IE
 
   
   
Case of exporting countries 
1 100                                                                                                             2.5
NIE
ESS
ED EXE
 
   
   
Case of countries which neither import nor export electricity 
1 100                                                                                                                       2.6
NIE
ESS
ED
 
   
   
Where IE represents imports of electricity and IE is equal to zero for countries that are self-
sufficient in terms of domestic electricity supply. On one hand, if a country has a surplus of 
electricity and exports it, then the total domestic supply of electricity (TDES) is equal to the 
domestic production of electricity (ED) minus the export of electricity (EXE). On the other hand, if a 
country has a deficit of electricity and relies on importation to fill the supply gap, then the total 
domestic supply of electricity (TDES) is equal to the sum of the domestic production of electricity 
(ED) and the importation of electricity (IE). If a country neither imports nor exports electricity, then 
its total domestic supply of electricity (TDES) is equal to its domestic production of electricity (ED). 
If the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency (ESS) is less than 100, this indicates that the country 
has an electricity supply gap and relies on importation of electricity to fill this gap: net imports of 
electricity are positive in this case. If the electricity supply self-sufficiency rate (ESS) is equal to 
100, this indicates that the country is self-sufficient in terms of its domestic electricity supply: net 
imports of electricity are equal to zero in this case. Finally, if the rate of electricity supply self-
sufficiency (ESS) is greater than 100, this indicates that the country is self-sufficient in terms of its 
domestic electricity supply, and has a surplus of electricity which is exported: net imports of 
electricity are negative in this case. 
Fourth, the share (RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total domestic production of electricity 
(ED) has been used as a proxy for the concept of “acceptability”. As said previously, the concept of 
“acceptability” also implies “sustainability”. Acceptability means that the type of energy used does 
not cause significant damage to the environment or to society. Such type of energy is a sustainable 
energy resource. For long-term and sustainable electricity supply security it is important to account 
for the concept of “acceptability”. As said previously, renewable electricity (RE) is a sustainable 
energy resource. The share (RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total domestic production of 
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electricity (ED) is defined as the ratio (RRE) of electricity produced domestically based on 
renewable sources (RE) to the total domestic production of electricity (ED). The denominator of the 
ratio is not total domestic electricity supply (TDES) (for importing countries, TDES is equal to the 
sum of total domestic production of electricity (ED) and imports of electricity (IE)), because 
countries do not always have control over the sources of electricity imported. Electricity imported 
can be renewable or non-renewable, and importing countries do not necessarily have control over 
the production of such electricity. One of the ways for importing countries to increase the share 
(RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total domestic supply of electricity (TDES) is to increase 
both their electricity supply self-sufficiency rate (ESS), and their share (RRE) of renewable 
electricity (RE) in the total domestic production of electricity (ED). Annual series on the share of 
renewable electricity in the total domestic production of electricity comprise the value zero for some 
of the years. As this study will be using a geometric mean to calculate the electricity supply 
disruption risks index, all indicators identified for the calculation of such index have to be of same 
sign. All indicators (RUB, ESS, GI) identified previously are of positive sign, and o 100 has been 
added to each value of the series on the share (RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total 
domestic production of electricity (ED), in order for all values of that series to be essentially 
positive. The share (RRE) of renewable electricity (RE) in the total domestic production of 
electricity (ED) highlights both countries’ ability to improve the sustainability of their electricity 
supply, and countries’ dependency on non-renewable electricity (NRE) in their domestic production 
of electricity. It is an increasing function of countries’ ability to improve the sustainability of their 
electricity supply by using more renewable electricity, and a decreasing function of countries 
dependency on non-renewable electricity (NRE) in their domestic production of electricity (ED). It is 
expressed as a percentage as follows: 
100 100                                                                                                                      2.7
RE
RRE
ED
  
  
Or 
1 100 100                                                                                                           2.8
NRE
RRE
ED
 
    
   
Other indicators, however, did not need any transformation. First, the rate of electricity supply 
efficiency (ESE) which is defined as the ratio of electricity not lost (ENL) to the total electricity 
supply (TES) has been used as one of the proxies for the concept of “availability” (in addition to the 
ratio of growth of urban access to electricity to growth of the urbanization rate), rather than the 
share of electricity losses (EL) in the total supply (TES). Total supply of electricity (TES) is equal to 
the sum of domestic production of electricity (ED) and imports of electricity (IE) in the case of an 
importing country. In other words, in that case TES is equal to TDES (total domestic supply of 
electricity). In the case of an exporting country, TES is equal to the domestic production of 
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electricity (ED). In other words, TES is equal to the sum of TDES (in that case TDES is equal to the 
domestic production of electricity (ED) minus exports of electricity (EXE)) and exports of electricity 
(EXE). In the case of countries which neither import nor export electricity, TES is equal to the total 
domestic production of electricity (ED). In other words, TES is equal to TDES (TDES in that case is 
equal to the domestic production of electricity). Electricity that is not lost (ENL) is the electricity 
distributed which reaches legal consumers. Electricity that reaches illegal consumers is considered 
as stolen electricity and therefore is a loss of electricity. Electricity not lost (ENL) comprises only 
the domestic legal consumption of electricity (EC) if the country is not exporting electricity. In the 
case of countries that export electricity, it comprises both the domestic legal consumption of 
electricity (EC) and exports of electricity (EXE). It highlights both the ability of countries’ electricity 
sector to be efficient by minimizing electricity losses, and the exposure of countries to electricity 
losses. It is an increasing function of countries’ ability to minimize electricity losses, and a 
decreasing function of countries’ exposure to electricity losses. It is expressed as a percentage as 
follows: 
General expression 
100                                                                                                                              2.9
ENL
ESE
TES
 
  
In other words,  
1 100                                                                                                                    2.10
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ESE
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 
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In the case of exporting countries 
100                                                                                                                    2.11
EC EXE
ESE
ED

 
 
In the case of importing countries  
100                                                                                                                        2.12
EC
ESE
ED IE
 

 
In the case of countries that neither import nor export electricity 
100                                                                                                                               2.13
EC
ESE
ED
 
 
Second, another proxy for the concept of “availability” is the rate of access to electricity (RACE). It 
is defined as the ratio of the population that has access to electricity (PACE) to the total population 
(TPO), and is expressed as a percentage. A value of such ratio less than 100 indicates that there 
is a supply gap in the country because a proportion of the population does not have access to 
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electricity. In other words, electricity is not available for a proportion of the population. This supply 
gap is considered as a total and continuous disruption of electricity supply encountered by the 
population that does not have access to electricity. Increasing access to electricity will contribute to 
reduce the supply gap of electricity. Conversely, a value of such ratio that is equal to 100 indicates 
that the entire population of the country has access to electricity, and there is no supply gap. In 
other words, electricity is available for the entire population. The rate of access to electricity 
(RACE) is a decreasing function of the electricity supply gap of total and continuous disruption of 
electricity supply. High values of such rate indicate that the country is making efforts to reduce its 
electricity supply gap, while low values of such rate indicate the presence of an important electricity 
supply gap in the country. The rate of access to electricity is expressed as follows: 
100                                                                                                                      2.14
PACE
RACE
TPO
 
  
Third, the share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) has 
been used as a proxy for the concept of “affordability”. It is defined as the ratio (RNEEX) of the 
proportion of real GDP not dedicated to cover the electricity supply expenditures (NEEX) to real 
GDP (RGDP). It can also be defined as one minus the share of GDP dedicated to cover the cost of 
the electricity supply (EEX). The cost of electricity supply is calculated by multiplying the total 
quantity of electricity supply converted in barrel of oil equivalent (bbl) by the annual real average 
crude oil price (COP) (US$/bbl; constant 2010 US$). The share of real GDP not dedicated to cover 
the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) highlights both countries’ ability to minimize the cost of 
electricity supply, and countries’ vulnerability to the high cost of electricity supply. High values of 
this ratio indicates that countries are able to minimize the cost of their electricity supply, while low 
values of this ratio indicates that countries are exposed to high costs of electricity supply. A high 
cost of electricity supply limits countries’ capacity to afford electricity, which can lead to a supply 
disruption of electricity. The share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply 
(RNEEX) is therefore an increasing function of countries’ ability to minimize the cost of electricity 
supply, and a decreasing function of countries exposure to high costs of electricity supply. It is 
expressed as a percentage as follows: 
100                                                                                                                   2.15
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Fourth, another proxy for the concept of “affordability” is real GDP per capita (RGDPc), which is 
one of the indicators of countries’ wealth and standard of living. Countries that have a high real 
GDP per capita (RGDPc) are wealthier and can offer a high standard of living to their population: 
this includes access to electricity, internet, decent housing and health care, public transport, etc. 
These countries are financially able to invest in electricity infrastructure and utilities in order to 
prevent or avoid future disruptions of the electricity supply. Conversely, countries that have a low 
real GDP per capita (RGDPc) are less wealthy and unable to offer a high standard of living, which 
will include access to electricity, internet, decent housing and health care, public transport, etc. In 
addition, these countries are financially limited in terms of investing in electricity infrastructure and 
utilities in order to prevent or avoid future disruptions of electricity supply. This is the case with a 
country such as Benin. As reported by the National policy framework for electricity (République du 
Bénin, 2008), one of the major causes of the supply gap in Benin is that the country is financially 
limited in terms of investing in electricity infrastructure which would increase the available supply. 
As a result of that, the rate of access to electricity in the country was only 41.40% in 2016, below 
the sub-Saharan Africa and world average rate of access to electricity, which were 42.81% and 
87.35% respectively. For the purpose of simplicity and in order to avoid having an indicator with a 
very high numerical range, real GDP per capita (RGDPc) of countries has been expressed as a 
percentage of the world average real GDP per capita (WRGDPc). This transformed real GDP per 
capita is denoted by RGDPcW and is expressed as follows: 
100                                                                                                            2.17
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2.4.2  Data 
All data collected are secondary and have been collected for the years 1996, 1998 and 2000, and 
over the period 2002-2015 (years and period for which data is available for all indicators at the 
same time, and years and period for which data is available for governance indicators) for the 
calculation of the composite index of electricity supply disruption risk. In order to observe 
separately the performance of Benin for each of the indicators/index included in the composite 
electricity supply disruption risk index, data on growth of urban access to electricity (∆UAE) and 
growth of the urbanization rate (∆UR) have been collected over the period 1996-2016; data on the 
rate of access to electricity (RACE) have been collected over the period 1990-2016; data on the 
share of renewable electricity in total domestic electricity supply (RRE) have been collected over 
the period 1996-2015; data on real GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) (as a percentage of the 
world average GDP per capita) (RGDPcW) have been collected over the period 1960-2017; data 
on real GDP (RGDP), average crude oil prices (COP), domestic supply of electricity (ED), 
electricity consumption (EC), imports of electricity (IE), net imports of electricity (NIE), exports of 
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electricity (EXE), total supply of electricity (TES) (sum of domestic production of electricity and 
imports of electricity), and electricity not lost (ENL) (electricity not lost electricity) (sum of electricity 
consumption and exports of electricity), and losses of electricity (EL), have been collected over the 
period 1980-2015.  
Sources of data are diverse. With regard to governance indicators, data on “control of corruption” 
(COC), “rule of law” (RLA), “quality of the regulatory system” (QAR), “government effectiveness” 
(GEF), and “political stability and absence of violence” (POS) have been collected from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018) website. Data on growth of urban access to electricity 
(∆UAE), growth of the urbanization rate (∆UR), the share of renewable electricity in the total 
domestic supply of electricity (RRE), real GDP (RGDP), real GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
(RGDPcW), and the rate of access to electricity (RACE) have been collected from the World 
Development Indicators (2018) website. The series on annual real average prices of crude oil 
(COP) (US$/bbl; constant 2010 US$) has been collected from the World Bank’s Commodity 
Markets (2018) website. Data on domestic electricity production (ED), imports of electricity (IE), net 
imports of electricity (NIE), exports of electricity (EXE), electricity consumption (EC), total supply of 
electricity (TES), electricity not lost (ENL) and losses of electricity (EL) have been collected from 
the US Energy Information Administration’s (2018) website. 
2.4.3  Method 
The method used for the calculation of the electricity supply disruption risks index is the geometric 
mean. It is defined as the pth root of the product of a set of scalars or numbers y1, y2,…yp. Its 
general expression is as follows: 
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The geometric mean is often used to calculate the average of a set of variables which have 
different properties and different numerical ranges. Using the arithmetic mean to calculate such 
average will give more weight to variables which have a high numerical range. The geometric 
mean levels the variables’ numerical range when averaging them, so that no numerical range has 
more weight than the others. In that way, a percentage change d in any variable yi has the same 
impact on the geometric mean. There have been previous uses of the geometric mean in the 
calculation of indexes such as the United Nation Development Program (UNDP)’s 2010 Human 
Development Index (HDI). The 2010 HDI is the geometric mean of Life Expectancy Index (LEI), 
Education Index (EI), and Income Index (II). In this study the geometric mean has been used to 
calculate a composite index of electricity supply disruption risk (ESRI) based on the following 
indicators/index: GI (country’s governance index), RUB (the ratio of the growth of access to 
electricity in urban areas to the growth of the urbanization rate), RACE (rate of access to 
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electricity), ESS (electricity supply self-sufficiency), ESE (the rate of electricity supply efficiency), 
RNEEX (the share of real GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply), RGDPcW 
(real GDP per capita expressed as a percentage of the world average real GDP per capita), and 
RRE (the share of renewable electricity in total domestic supply of electricity). As said previously, 
the geometric mean has also been used to calculate the governance index (GI). The composite 
index of electricity supply disruption risk is expressed as follows: 
8                                          2.19ESRI GI RUB ESS ESE RNEEX RRE RACE RGDPcW       
  
High values of ESRI indicate that the country has a low risk of electricity supply disruption, while 
low values of ESRI indicate the country has a high risk of electricity supply disruption. In other 
words, ESRI is a decreasing function of disruption risks of electricity supply. For the purposes of 
simplicity, this study uses a composite index of electricity supply disruption risk (ESRI) with values 
as small numbers, varying in the range 0 to 2. Hence, the inverse values of the initial electricity 
supply disruption risk index (ESRI) have been calculated and each has been multiplied by 100. 
These transformed values of initial electricity supply disruption risk index (ESRI) constitute the 
values of a new index called modified electricity supply disruption risk index (MESRI). High values 
of MESRI indicate that the country has a high risk of electricity supply disruption, while low values 
of MESRI indicate that the country has a low risk of electricity supply disruption. In other words, 
MESRI is an increasing function of disruption risk of electricity supply. It is expressed as follows: 
8
1
100                            2.20   MESRI
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 
      
  
2.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The performance of Benin as related to disruption risk to electricity supply has been measured by 
the modified index of electricity supply disruption risk (MESRI). We can notice in tables 2.1, 2.2 
that Benin has remained among countries that have a very high level of disruption to electricity 
supply and was ranked fourth country in the world in terms of disruption to electricity supply over 
the periods 2002-2005 and 2006-2010, and with an index (MESRI) score of 2.157 and 2.036 for 
both periods respectively. In the period 2011-2015, Benin was ranked third country in the world in 
terms of disruption to electricity supply with a score of 2.132 for the index (MESRI) (Table 2.3). 
These results emphasize the fact that Benin is among the most vulnerable countries in the world in 
terms of disruption of electricity supply. We can also notice on tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 that most sub-
Saharan African countries constitute the group of countries that have an extreme, a very high or 
high disruption to electricity supply, while most of the wealthiest countries in the world constitute 
the group of countries that have a low disruption to electricity supply. This aligns with IEA (2018), 
statistics from the World Development Indicators (2018) and the US EIA (2018) which emphasize 
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that sub-Saharan African countries have the lowest access to electricity and the lowest 
consumption of electricity. This also aligns with Ferguson et al. (2000) who argued that a positive 
correlation exists between countries’ wealth and their energy consumption. Wealthy countries have 
high access to energy/electricity and high consumption of energy/electricity. In other words, they 
have less supply gap of energy/electricity or less disruption to energy/electricity. Conversely, poor 
countries have low access to energy/electricity and low consumption of energy/electricity. In other 
words, they have more supply gap of energy/electricity or more disruption to energy/electricity 
supply. Figure 2.2 represents the history of the performance of Benin as related to disruption of 
electricity supply in 1996, 1998, 2000, and over the period 2002-2015. On the vertical axis, we 
have the modified index of electricity supply disruption risk (MESRI), while on the abscissa line, we 
have the corresponding years. MESRI is an increasing function of the level of disruption to 
electricity supply. We can notice that the level of disruption of electricity in the country has 
remained very high or high over the entire period of time. The years 1996, 1998, 2000, the periods 
2002-2006 and 2009-2013, correspond to times of very high level of disruption to electricity supply, 
while the periods 2007-2008 and 2014-2015 correspond to time of high level of disruption to 
electricity supply. These observed patterns of the modified index of electricity supply disruption risk 
(MESRI) on Figure 2.2 align with the historical facts observed in the Beninese electricity sector. 
The years or periods of very high level of disruption to electricity supply correspond to years of 
severe electricity crises such as 1994, 1998, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2013. These electricity 
crises have affected the country over consecutives years, that is the reason why for instance in 
1996 the country was still facing a very high level of disruption to electricity supply which started in 
1994. 
 
Figure 2.2: History of the modified electricity supply disruption index of Benin (MESRI) 
(1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2015)  
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Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from US EIA (2018), World Development 
Indicators (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank Commodity Markets 
(2018) 
Table 2.1: Ranking and classification of countries (for which data is available) according to 
their modified electricity supply disruption risk index (MESRI) (Average 2002-2005) 
Level of overall performance as 
related to electricity supply 
disruption  
Countries 
Average MESRI 
(2002-2005) 
World 
ranking 
Extremely high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is above 2.5) Liberia 4.685771643 1 
Very high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is between 2 and 2.5) Niger 2.307595741 2 
 
Burundi 2.214406178 3 
 
Benin 2.157051004 4 
 
Congo (Kinshasa) 2.146414594 5 
 
Rwanda 2.122691463 6 
 
Chad 2.108546286 7 
 
Guinea-Bissau 2.00622311 8 
High level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is between 1.5 and 2) Malawi 1.968934759 9 
 
Togo 1.963270527 10 
 
Sierra Leone 1.932480649 11 
 
Mozambique 1.918415224 12 
 
Burkina Faso 1.918216995 13 
 
Central African Republic 1.913748313 14 
 
Ethiopia 1.870598191 15 
 
Cambodia 1.849833357 16 
 
Afghanistan 1.841630254 17 
 
Madagascar 1.806467268 18 
 
Tanzania 1.797908137 19 
 
Uganda 1.786997943 20 
 
Lesotho 1.71517887 21 
 
Mali 1.687079263 22 
 
Gambia, The 1.663607179 23 
 
Solomon Islands 1.662571245 24 
 
Eritrea 1.662291718 25 
 
Haiti 1.648202618 26 
 
Guinea 1.625396587 27 
 
Mauritania 1.606457882 28 
 
Bangladesh 1.601982541 29 
 
Kenya 1.582577616 30 
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Myanmar 1.55108931 31 
 
Senegal 1.544726169 32 
 
Papua New Guinea 1.539858288 33 
 
Nepal 1.536824785 34 
 
Zimbabwe 1.521797047 35 
Medium level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is between 1 and 1.5) Comoros 1.489649621 36 
 
Zambia 1.482523448 37 
 
Sudan 1.482207922 38 
 
Swaziland 1.452515245 39 
 
Yemen, Rep. 1.448529362 40 
 
India 1.44719257 41 
 
Botswana 1.427063891 42 
 
São Tomé and Principe 1.422211189 43 
 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1.392037712 44 
 
Vanuatu 1.384574081 45 
 
Nigeria 1.375305659 46 
 
Pakistan 1.375244369 47 
Angola 1.369902164 48 
 
Ghana 1.36970696 49 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 1.367522916 50 
 
Lao PDR 1.35451535 51 
 
Tajikistan 1.352703396 52 
 
Mongolia 1.347712804 53 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.342406543 54 
 
Cameroon 1.342142044 55 
 
Uzbekistan 1.324890974 56 
 
Nicaragua 1.323902993 57 
 
Vietnam 1.310108366 58 
 
Moldova 1.307993396 59 
 
Honduras 1.289163584 60 
 
Guyana 1.256052299 61 
 
Bolivia 1.250294084 62 
 
Cape Verde 1.248661206 63 
 
Namibia 1.244374564 64 
 
Philippines 1.242964812 65 
 
Sri Lanka 1.224042662 66 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.21876418 67 
 
Indonesia 1.205214911 68 
 
Azerbaijan 1.204725603 69 
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Bhutan 1.199750135 70 
 
Ukraine 1.189839649 71 
 
China 1.181734429 72 
 
Belize 1.180285978 73 
 
Turkmenistan 1.177772145 74 
 
Guatemala 1.175638231 75 
 
Armenia 1.174188092 76 
 
Cuba 1.157282374 77 
 
Jordan 1.156797111 78 
 
Belarus 1.15308081 79 
 
Tunisia 1.147775256 80 
 
Macedonia, FYR 1.145118051 81 
 
Iraq 1.14452219 82 
 
Georgia 1.14307158 83 
 
Dominican Republic 1.135242808 84 
 
Albania 1.130849679 85 
 
El Salvador 1.130336269 86 
 
Jamaica 1.129580531 87 
 
Algeria 1.12887494 88 
 
Thailand 1.124664479 89 
 
Fiji 1.104190064 90 
 
Lebanon 1.102339257 91 
 
Samoa 1.098591787 92 
 
Peru 1.092922287 93 
 
Ecuador 1.091630656 94 
 
South Africa 1.085307494 95 
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.085154268 96 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.079248233 97 
 
Maldives 1.07827902 98 
 
Saint Vincent/Grenadines 1.06424126 99 
 
Bulgaria 1.063234413 100 
 
Grenada 1.061128514 101 
 
Kazakhstan 1.050735859 102 
 
Dominica 1.04095786 103 
 
Panama 1.040374983 104 
 
Saint Lucia 1.03804551 105 
 
Colombia 1.030749375 106 
 
Libya 1.029544735 107 
 
Mauritius 1.028913894 108 
 
Malaysia 1.02695555 109 
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Romania 1.017877985 110 
 
Paraguay 1.011153523 111 
 
Argentina 1.010396464 112 
 
Seychelles 1.009123549 113 
 
Russian Federation 1.005437524 114 
 
Mexico 1.005064232 115 
 
Turkey 1.000464373 116 
Low level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is between 0.5 and 1) Equatorial Guinea 0.998785526 117 
 
Lithuania 0.996176551 118 
 
Poland 0.992279535 119 
 
Hungary 0.987073837 120 
 
Suriname 0.986951963 121 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.977495904 122 
 
Gabon 0.973724147 123 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.966708254 124 
 
Estonia 0.964309429 125 
 
Uruguay 0.95813056 126 
 
Brazil 0.954895334 127 
 
Venezuela, RB 0.950800797 128 
 
Costa Rica 0.941894147 129 
 
Slovak Republic 0.938941403 130 
 
Barbados 0.938520052 131 
 
Chile 0.937873719 132 
 
Czech Republic 0.924034575 133 
 
Malta 0.92211803 134 
 
Macao SAR, China 0.921789856 135 
 
Korea, Rep. 0.918745766 136 
 
Bahrain 0.900168674 137 
 
Croatia 0.898316557 138 
 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.892775689 139 
 
Latvia 0.890135768 140 
 
Portugal 0.884389261 141 
 
Israel 0.878774734 142 
 
Slovenia 0.873288678 143 
 
Greece 0.872781451 144 
 
Bahamas, The 0.863578454 145 
 
Cyprus 0.86302634 146 
 
Spain 0.848761673 147 
 
Brunei Darussalam 0.84604758 148 
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Singapore 0.83836002 149 
 
Germany 0.837510671 150 
 
United Kingdom 0.836244909 151 
 
France 0.834357575 152 
 
Belgium 0.830736928 153 
 
Netherlands 0.824005275 154 
 
Italy 0.820578642 155 
 
Japan 0.814403126 156 
 
Ireland 0.810829211 157 
 
Australia 0.807659844 158 
 
United States 0.807643487 159 
 
New Zealand 0.803685271 160 
 
United Arab Emirates 0.802087049 161 
 
Qatar 0.796220806 162 
 
Finland 0.79436511 163 
 
Iceland 0.777427 164 
 
Sweden 0.776728769 165 
 
Austria 0.774607643 166 
 
Canada 0.772876857 167 
 
Denmark 0.758704439 168 
 
Bermuda 0.756669032 169 
 
Switzerland 0.733437378 170 
 
Luxembourg 0.710063639 171 
 Norway 0.695226182 172 
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on data from US EIA (2018), World Development Indicators (2018), 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank Commodity Markets (2018) 
Table 2.2: Ranking and classification of countries (for which data is available) according to their 
modified electricity supply disruption risk index (MESRI) (average 2006-2010) 
Level of overall performance as 
related to electricity supply 
disruption  
Countries 
Average MESRI  
(2006-2010) 
World 
ranking 
Extremely high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI above 2.5) Liberia 2.656688662 1 
Very high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is between 2 and 
2.5) Niger 2.346248769 2 
 
Burundi 2.160915782 3 
 
Benin 2.036629441 4 
High level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is between 1.5 and 2) Congo (Kinshasa) 1.995919878 5 
 
Guinea-Bissau 1.992477318 6 
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Togo 1.978843121 7 
 
Chad 1.977497989 8 
 
Rwanda 1.9631891 9 
 
Malawi 1.942206232 10 
 
Burkina Faso 1.884295247 11 
 
Sierra Leone 1.86441975 12 
 
Central African Republic 1.859601736 13 
 
Mozambique 1.834860809 14 
 
Madagascar 1.834446658 15 
 
Tanzania 1.787739228 16 
 
Uganda 1.771767867 17 
 
Ethiopia 1.737039543 18 
 
Cambodia 1.732122353 19 
 
Afghanistan 1.687328015 20 
 
Haiti 1.682503188 21 
 
Eritrea 1.673424407 22 
 
Gambia, The 1.643827703 23 
 
Mali 1.620053054 24 
 
Solomon Islands 1.595772834 25 
 
Guinea 1.595429997 26 
 
Lesotho 1.564179605 27 
 
Kenya 1.554952272 28 
 
Zimbabwe 1.545649782 29 
 
Bangladesh 1.531935251 30 
 
Mauritania 1.51888985 31 
Medium level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is between 1 and 
1.5) Papua New Guinea 1.498337097 32 
 
Nepal 1.489017892 33 
 
Botswana 1.482518888 34 
 
Senegal 1.478690593 35 
 
Comoros 1.476324024 36 
 
Zambia 1.460428563 37 
 
Sudan 1.443159821 38 
 
Yemen, Rep. 1.436188809 39 
 
Myanmar 1.433334943 40 
 
São Tomé and Principe 1.401494828 41 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 1.396336492 42 
 
Swaziland 1.386533898 43 
 
Cameroon 1.383712075 44 
 
India 1.377807369 45 
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Pakistan 1.343221065 46 
 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1.341450449 47 
 
Tajikistan 1.338862213 48 
 
Ghana 1.3360555 49 
 
Kiribati 1.334493483 50 
 
Vanuatu 1.330836282 51 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.330010737 52 
 
Nigeria 1.315433205 53 
 
Mongolia 1.303706822 54 
 
Nicaragua 1.301809061 55 
 
Uzbekistan 1.293797803 56 
 
Moldova 1.289964638 57 
 
Vietnam 1.289733862 58 
 
Lao PDR 1.286306979 59 
 
Guyana 1.271183103 60 
 
Honduras 1.259132268 61 
 
Angola 1.252651181 62 
 
Namibia 1.249386028 63 
 
Morocco 1.246989772 64 
 
Macedonia, FYR 1.246718684 65 
 
Bolivia 1.226769043 66 
 
Philippines 1.226328413 67 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.20243546 68 
 
Cape Verde 1.192960498 69 
 
Sri Lanka 1.181597703 70 
 
Indonesia 1.177032089 71 
 
Ukraine 1.164326905 72 
 
Iraq 1.163205584 73 
 
Tonga 1.159765737 74 
 
Guatemala 1.156018811 75 
 
Jordan 1.155969347 76 
 
Belize 1.145052098 77 
 
Jamaica 1.142256509 78 
 
Tunisia 1.138983682 79 
 
Cuba 1.138850693 80 
 
Algeria 1.137946078 81 
 
Turkmenistan 1.135135708 82 
 
Albania 1.133379937 83 
 
Bhutan 1.131824448 84 
 
China 1.122816982 85 
37 
 
 
El Salvador 1.122095799 86 
 
Armenia 1.119443025 87 
 
Belarus 1.105460968 88 
 
Georgia 1.104367934 89 
 
Thailand 1.103888903 90 
 
Azerbaijan 1.098101335 91 
 
Samoa 1.097619692 92 
 
Fiji 1.097318924 93 
 
Dominican Republic 1.094844315 94 
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.079375217 95 
 
Lebanon 1.077798149 96 
 
South Africa 1.076990857 97 
 
Ecuador 1.076457914 98 
 
Peru 1.068085345 99 
 
Serbia 1.066816047 100 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.060344023 101 
 
Maldives 1.058969646 102 
 
Grenada 1.053085603 103 
 
Saint Vincent/Grenadines 1.053022948 104 
 
Dominica 1.042710156 105 
 
Bulgaria 1.036632887 106 
 
Saint Lucia 1.033926933 107 
 
Montenegro 1.021080779 108 
 
Kazakhstan 1.020407772 109 
 
Malaysia 1.018361037 110 
 
Colombia 1.017644174 111 
 
Mauritius 1.017243409 112 
 
Mexico 1.013836369 113 
 
Paraguay 1.013611271 114 
 
Panama 1.013148504 115 
 
Libya 1.007596405 116 
 
Gabon 1.002628957 117 
 
Seychelles 1.000930492 118 
Low level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is between 0.5 and 1) Romania 0.995991826 119 
 
Argentina 0.992913408 120 
 
Turkey 0.987561964 121 
 
Russian Federation 0.984484749 122 
 
Suriname 0.981576112 123 
 
Hungary 0.980278212 124 
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Poland 0.976189434 125 
 
Equatorial Guinea 0.974382486 126 
 
Lithuania 0.96674191 127 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.966456249 128 
 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.963043537 129 
 
Uruguay 0.950496236 130 
 
Brazil 0.946603585 131 
 
Costa Rica 0.945589638 132 
 
Estonia 0.945282352 133 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.938686054 134 
 
Barbados 0.938663559 135 
 
Chile 0.934376643 136 
 
Venezuela, RB 0.930677741 137 
 
Saudi Arabia 0.930183559 138 
 
Slovak Republic 0.923686243 139 
 
Malta 0.923662916 140 
 
Bahrain 0.919839736 141 
 
Czech Republic 0.913041551 142 
 
Korea, Rep. 0.911151335 143 
 
Croatia 0.903875551 144 
 
Macao SAR, China 0.890309516 145 
 
Puerto Rico 0.884024271 146 
 
Portugal 0.883117124 147 
 
Latvia 0.881758364 148 
 
Bahamas, The 0.877471101 149 
 
Israel 0.875543216 150 
 
Guam 0.874146028 151 
 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.871840662 152 
 
Cyprus 0.864296067 153 
 
Slovenia 0.863764415 154 
 
Greece 0.861708373 155 
 
Brunei Darussalam 0.854455004 156 
 
United Arab Emirates 0.847630362 157 
 
Spain 0.8459923 158 
 
France 0.841283871 159 
 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 0.839604778 160 
 
United Kingdom 0.838797742 161 
 
Singapore 0.829996043 162 
 Belgium 0.829241985 163 
 
Italy 0.824992909 164 
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Japan 0.819575767 165 
 
Germany 0.818297755 166 
 
Ireland 0.817009705 167 
 
Netherlands 0.816994602 168 
 
United States 0.81301747 169 
 
Australia 0.808715063 170 
 
New Zealand 0.806958099 171 
 
Qatar 0.802762861 172 
 
Finland 0.793628017 173 
 
Canada 0.778118775 174 
 
Austria 0.775351574 175 
 
Iceland 0.774207029 176 
 
Sweden 0.773894945 177 
 
Denmark 0.760626331 178 
 
Bermuda 0.758655337 179 
 
Luxembourg 0.740073362 180 
 
Switzerland 0.734803274 181 
 Norway 0.696877237 182 
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on data from US EIA (2018), World Development 
Indicators (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank Commodity Markets 
(2018) 
Table 2.3: Ranking and classification of countries (for which data is available) according to 
their modified electricity supply disruption risk index (MESRI) (Average 2011-2015) 
Level of overall performance as 
related to electricity supply 
disruption  
Countries 
Average MESRI 
 (2011-2015) 
World 
ranking 
Very high level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is between 2 and 2.5) Niger 2.225437266 1 
 
Liberia 2.202497974 2 
 
Benin 2.132814665 3 
 
Burundi 2.102525658 4 
 Togo 2.045730524 5 
High level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is between 1.5 and 2) Chad 1.893196024 6 
 
Madagascar 1.891541179 7 
 
Burkina Faso 1.878838442 8 
 
Guinea-Bissau 1.873979825 9 
 
Malawi 1.848984528 10 
 
Central African Republic 1.837616989 11 
 
Congo (Kinshasa) 1.799327872 12 
 
Haiti 1.770313729 13 
 
Sierra Leone 1.758559475 14 
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Rwanda 1.750305986 15 
 
Mozambique 1.726889583 16 
 
Tanzania 1.721383781 17 
 
Afghanistan 1.679885887 18 
 
Uganda 1.658225438 19 
 
Gambia, The 1.641927961 20 
 
Ethiopia 1.618884016 21 
 
Mali 1.56337743 22 
 
Cambodia 1.546450664 23 
 
Guinea 1.545755187 24 
 
Zimbabwe 1.504454766 25 
 
Mauritania 1.502884237 26 
Medium level of disruption risk 
(Average MESRI is between 1 and 1.5) Yemen, Rep. 1.471120985 27 
 
Bangladesh 1.46905552 28 
 
Kenya 1.46404513 29 
 
Cameroon 1.463592717 30 
 
Comoros 1.455184658 31 
 
Senegal 1.449664267 32 
 
Papua New Guinea 1.439315874 33 
 
Solomon Islands 1.436252358 34 
 
Nepal 1.433968994 35 
 
Lesotho 1.432648835 36 
 
Macedonia, FYR 1.399460384 37 
 
Zambia 1.391499095 38 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 1.38800356 39 
 
São Tomé and Principe 1.387002599 40 
 
Botswana 1.367234517 41 
 
Myanmar 1.355199023 42 
 
Sudan 1.34910083 43 
 
Pakistan 1.329846883 44 
 
India 1.319039734 45 
 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1.315808361 46 
 
Kiribati 1.311159483 47 
 
Swaziland 1.304850343 48 
 
Vanuatu 1.304691593 49 
 
Kyrgyz Republic 1.301135886 50 
 
Tajikistan 1.293197263 51 
 
Nigeria 1.288693643 52 
 
Ghana 1.274999372 53 
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Moldova 1.264766849 54 
 
Nicaragua 1.256636854 55 
 Uzbekistan 1.250549338 56 
 
Vietnam 1.244604874 57 
 
Angola 1.243959794 58 
 
Namibia 1.243942995 59 
 
Honduras 1.24312696 60 
 
Lao PDR 1.232291884 61 
 
Mongolia 1.219884548 62 
 
Guyana 1.214554811 63 
 
Libya 1.205203235 64 
 
Bolivia 1.204828448 65 
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.203530427 66 
 
Philippines 1.202086896 67 
 
Morocco 1.200901517 68 
 
Belize 1.174825317 69 
 
Ukraine 1.172773885 70 
 
Jordan 1.17224932 71 
 
Jamaica 1.162006634 72 
 
Iraq 1.155830624 73 
 
Tonga 1.152220169 74 
 
Cape Verde 1.149742427 75 
 
Indonesia 1.148995455 76 
 
Tunisia 1.141112418 77 
 
Algeria 1.138185982 78 
 
Cuba 1.136244766 79 
 
Guatemala 1.135078043 80 
 
Sri Lanka 1.12743816 81 
 
Albania 1.126802047 82 
 
El Salvador 1.111552382 83 
 
Samoa 1.109953989 84 
 
Armenia 1.098510552 85 
 
Thailand 1.092342947 86 
 
Belarus 1.090577538 87 
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.084836923 88 
 
Azerbaijan 1.081582667 89 
 
Dominican Republic 1.0794525 90 
 
Fiji 1.077522944 91 
 
Turkmenistan 1.077138217 92 
 
Lebanon 1.075412489 93 
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South Africa 1.072194465 94 
 
Georgia 1.071388112 95 
 
Serbia 1.068304028 96 
 
Bhutan 1.067033655 97 
 
China 1.064667888 98 
 
Grenada 1.058456816 99 
 
Nauru 1.05833533 100 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.057796124 101 
 
Ecuador 1.055965156 102 
 
Saint Vincent/Grenadines 1.050477399 103 
 
Maldives 1.048914264 104 
 
Peru 1.045019739 105 
 
Saint Lucia 1.042461767 106 
 
Montenegro 1.041906528 107 
 
Dominica 1.035391299 108 
 
Bulgaria 1.019453798 109 
 
Mexico 1.014539548 110 
 
Kazakhstan 1.008513323 111 
 
Malaysia 1.003625078 112 
 
Mauritius 1.001565455 113 
 
Gabon 1.001231834 114 
 Paraguay 1.000457149 115 
Low level of disruption risk (Average 
MESRI is between 0.5 and 1) Colombia 0.995569668 116 
 
Argentina 0.992189641 117 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.988946122 118 
 
Romania 0.988314583 119 
 
Hungary 0.987420319 120 
 
Suriname 0.987161007 121 
 
Equatorial Guinea 0.9861079 122 
 
Seychelles 0.984425425 123 
 
Russian Federation 0.980669564 124 
 
Panama 0.979577998 125 
 
Turkey 0.967307055 126 
 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.962155082 127 
 
Costa Rica 0.957311854 128 
 
Oman 0.956868314 129 
 
Poland 0.954922656 130 
 
Barbados 0.949194342 131 
 
Brazil 0.942779938 132 
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Trinidad and Tobago 0.941994428 133 
 
Estonia 0.933170038 134 
 
Lithuania 0.930536022 135 
 
Saudi Arabia 0.926950313 136 
 
Chile 0.925878979 137 
 
Bahrain 0.9210716 138 
 
Slovak Republic 0.915720536 139 
 
Czech Republic 0.910745379 140 
 
Malta 0.910583242 141 
 
Uruguay 0.910304665 142 
 
Croatia 0.906147997 143 
 
Korea, Rep. 0.902011098 144 
 
Bahamas, The 0.890382673 145 
 
Puerto Rico 0.888057913 146 
 
Macao SAR, China 0.88650407 147 
 
Greece 0.883237232 148 
 
Portugal 0.879778706 149 
 
Cyprus 0.876678895 150 
 
Guam 0.875223812 151 
 
Israel 0.874139459 152 
 
Kuwait 0.874012093 153 
 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 0.873637972 154 
 
Latvia 0.871552129 155 
 
Slovenia 0.870493351 156 
 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.868079314 157 
 
Brunei Darussalam 0.867408514 158 
 
United Arab Emirates 0.857814509 159 
 
France 0.851896184 160 
 
Spain 0.849248062 161 
 
United Kingdom 0.838411342 162 
 Belgium 0.835209307 163 
 
Italy 0.824212325 164 
 
Luxembourg 0.822045234 165 
 
Netherlands 0.820635968 166 
 
Japan 0.818453082 167 
 
Singapore 0.817553438 168 
 
Ireland 0.814933512 169 
 
United States 0.813762233 170 
 
Germany 0.810358193 171 
 
Australia 0.805222568 172 
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New Zealand 0.802413885 173 
 
Canada 0.80090301 174 
 
Qatar 0.798057171 175 
 
Finland 0.79699411 176 
 
Iceland 0.795056822 177 
 
Greenland 0.786234133 178 
 
Austria 0.779325759 179 
 
Sweden 0.764031436 180 
 
Denmark 0.749499872 181 
 
Switzerland 0.735915036 182 
 Norway 0.698889047 183 
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on data from US EIA (2018), World Development 
Indicators (2018), Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018), World Bank Commodity Markets 
(2018). 
The modified index of electricity supply disruption risks (MESRI) can provide several benefits. First, 
it will be a very useful tool in the hands of policy makers for the monitoring and evaluation of a 
country’s performance related to electricity security. In Benin, it will contribute to the achievement 
of one of the sub-objectives of the national policy framework for electricity (Républic du Bénin, 
2008): to define and improve performance indicators for the electricity sectors and the national 
electricity distribution company. To the best of the writer’s knowledge, no performance indicator 
exists to measure the security of electricity supply. The current modified index of disruption risks to 
electricity supply will contribute to fill this gap by being a tool for the measurement of the 
performance of the country in terms of electricity supply security. 
Second, MESRI will be a useful tool for domestic and foreign private investors when assessing the 
ease of doing business in Benin and other countries of the world. As said previously, some of the 
criteria when assessing the ease of doing business in a country are easy access to electricity and 
the absence or low frequency of disruption risks to electricity supply. MESRI measures the overall 
performance of a country in terms of disruption risks to electricity supply. It also facilitates the 
understanding of how a country performs according to access to electricity, electricity supply 
efficiency, electricity supply self-sufficiency, sustainability of electricity supply (in other words the 
share of renewable electricity used), influence of urbanization on electricity supply, governance, 
capacity to cover the cost of electricity supply and electricity infrastructure. Therefore, it provides 
for domestic and foreign private investors, a whole spectrum of indicators by which countries can 
be assessed in terms of ease of doing business. 
Third, MESRI will be a useful tool for development finance institutions such as the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Inter-
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American Development Bank (IADB) when assessing countries’ need for investments in 
infrastructure (physical infrastructure such as power plant, or institutional infrastructure such as 
governance system or regulatory system in the electricity sector, etc.) as related to disruption to 
electricity supply. A high or very high level of disruption risk to electricity supply in a country 
indicates the need for investment in electricity infrastructure (either physical infrastructure, or 
institutional infrastructure, or both).  
Fourth, MESRI is the first composite index of electricity supply security (to the best of the writer’s 
knowledge). It will be a useful tool for research institutions such as the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), the United States Energy Information Administration (US EIA), and research department of 
development finance institutions such as AfDB, ADB, IADB and the World Bank in assessing 
countries’ performance in terms of electricity security, and in forecasting electricity supply security 
for countries. 
Empirical results on the performance of Benin with regard to each of the indicators included in the 
calculation of the composite index of electricity supply disruption risks have been analyzed in order 
to understand better why Benin is a country with a very high level of disruption risk to electricity 
supply. First, the performance of Benin with regard to the governance index (GI) is shown in Figure 
2.3, which represents the history of Benin’s performance in terms of governance for the year 1996, 
1998, 2000, and over the period 2002-2015. On the vertical axis, we have the governance index 
(GI) values, while on the abscissa line, we have the corresponding years. We can notice that the 
performance of Benin in regard to the governance index (GI) has been decreasing as shown by the 
overall downward trend on Figure 2.3. In other words, Benin’s combined performance in terms of 
“control of corruption”, “rule of law”, “quality of the regulatory system”, “government effectiveness”, 
“political stability and absence of violence” has a downward trend. In the electricity sector, this 
overall reduction of governance performance can be illustrated by the mismanagement of the 
delivery of electricity to consumers in the country. As mentioned in the national policy framework 
for electricity (“document de politique et de strategie de development du secteur de l’energie 
electrique”, page 30 and 31, by République du Bénin (2008)) there have been mismanagements in 
the Beninese electricity sector, low quality of the delivery of service to consumers, low technical 
and financial performance of transmission and distribution’s companies (SBEE and CEB). The low 
performance of these two public companies is mainly due to unprofitable investments made 
because of political considerations. In addition, because of government social and political agenda, 
the national pricing policy imposes on these companies a price of electricity that is below the 
production cost of electricity. When compared to other countries, Benin is ranked 70th out of 183 
countries in the world and 37th out of 50 countries in Africa in terms of risks associated with 
governance, with a five years average governance index value of 99.592 (Table 2.4). The 
governance index (GI) as presented in Table 2.4 is a decreasing function of countries’ risks 
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associated with governance (Countries with low values of governance index (GI) have high risks 
related to governance, while countries with high values of governance index (GI) have low risks 
related to governance). 
 
Figure 2.3: Evolution of Benin’s governance system (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2016)  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018)) 
Table 2.4: African countries’ ranking according to their performance in terms of governance 
(GI) (average 2011-2015) (only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average GI  
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Libya 98.38290638 2 1 
Congo (Kinshasa) 98.38827761 3 2 
Sudan 98.43187786 4 3 
Central African Republic 98.47710277 5 4 
Zimbabwe 98.64315481 8 5 
Chad 98.72074994 10 6 
Guinea-Bissau 98.77794398 11 7 
Nigeria 98.78024322 12 8 
Equatorial Guinea 98.81305282 14 9 
Burundi 98.81754307 15 10 
Guinea 98.87508104 18 11 
Congo (Brazzaville) 98.97011097 21 12 
Angola 98.9891335 22 13 
Comoros 99.03208796 23 14 
Cameroon 99.06118556 25 15 
Mali 99.1157457 27 16 
Liberia 99.12312191 28 17 
Mauritania 99.12677987 29 18 
Côte d’Ivoire 99.13355442 30 19 
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Algeria 99.13702376 31 20 
Togo 99.15103423 34 21 
Ethiopia 99.16483503 35 22 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 99.17798929 36 23 
Madagascar 99.21350248 38 24 
Sierra Leone 99.21569522 39 25 
Kenya 99.26972217 41 26 
Niger 99.27185802 42 27 
Uganda 99.39480897 54 28 
Mozambique 99.49538401 56 29 
Gabon 99.50819165 57 30 
Tanzania 99.51362915 59 31 
Burkina Faso 99.520991 60 32 
Gambia, The 99.5233781 61 33 
Swaziland 99.53366145 62 34 
São Tomé and Principe 99.54344147 65 35 
Malawi 99.57168156 68 36 
Benin 99.59274034 70 37 
Tunisia 99.73909142 84 38 
Zambia 99.74832098 85 39 
Senegal 99.76983258 87 40 
Morocco 99.77281892 88 41 
Lesotho 99.81741275 94 42 
Ghana 99.97996793 105 43 
Rwanda 100.0681044 109 44 
South Africa 100.1478267 115 45 
Seychelles 100.279436 120 46 
Namibia 100.3037207 121 47 
Cape Verde 100.4389105 127 48 
Botswana 100.7178659 141 49 
Mauritius 100.8287029 147 50 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018) 
Second, the performance of Benin in terms of effort to avoid a supply gap of electricity in urban 
areas is shown in Figure 2.4, which represents the history of the ratio of growth of access to 
electricity in urbans area to growth of urbanization (RUB), in Benin over the period 1996-2016. On 
the abscissa line are the years, and on the vertical axis are the values of the ratio (RUB) expressed 
as percentages. We can notice that values of the ratio (RUB) have remained below 100% over the 
entire period. This indicates that in Benin, urbanization has been growing more rapidly than access 
to electricity in urban area. This situation is one of the causes of the electricity supply gap in urban 
areas. However, the ratio (RUB) has an upward overall trend over the entire period (1996-2016). 
This indicates that though growth of urbanization is higher than urban access to electricity, the 
overall trend of access to electricity in urban areas is upward. When compared to other countries in 
terms of performance related to the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to growth 
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of urbanization (RUB), Benin is ranked 36th out of 183 countries in the world and 24th out of 50 
countries in Africa, with a five years average ratio (RUB)’s value of 96.388% (Table 2.5). The ratio 
of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to growth of urbanization (RUB) is a decreasing 
function of risks associated withthe electricity supply gap in urban areas (low values of the ratio 
indicates high risks of electricity supply gap in urban areas, while high values of the ratio indicates 
low risks of electricity supply gap in urban areas).  
 
Figure 2.4: History of the ratio of growth of access to electricity in urban areas to growth of 
urbanization in Benin (1996-2016) 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018) 
Table 2.5: African countries’ ranking according to their performance in terms of the ratio of 
growth of urban access to electricity to growth of urbanization (RUB) (average 2011-2015) 
(only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average RUB 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Rwanda 94.24252036 4 1 
Burkina Faso 94.37520092 5 2 
Burundi 94.77205278 6 3 
Uganda 94.81692181 7 4 
Tanzania 94.84446582 9 5 
Angola 94.92335282 11 6 
Niger 95.13831153 13 7 
Mali 95.27612607 14 8 
Ethiopia 95.29776228 15 9 
Madagascar 95.60521901 17 10 
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Equatorial Guinea 95.60979508 18 11 
Nigeria 95.65355695 19 12 
Congo (Kinshasa) 95.67035186 20 13 
Namibia 95.71273182 21 14 
Kenya 95.90904976 26 15 
Gambia, The 95.92410973 27 16 
Zambia 96.10948939 28 17 
Guinea-Bissau 96.12526088 29 18 
Mauritania 96.15142574 30 19 
Côte d’Ivoire 96.29174699 31 20 
Togo 96.30984121 32 21 
Malawi 96.35111274 33 22 
Cameroon 96.38441995 35 23 
Benin 96.38850118 36 24 
Senegal 96.48816319 38 25 
Mozambique 96.49618401 39 26 
Ghana 96.50294122 40 27 
Chad 96.53196795 41 28 
Gabon 96.53602863 42 29 
Guinea 96.59176672 43 30 
São Tomé and Principe 96.86267582 47 31 
Congo (Brazzaville) 96.89308672 49 32 
Lesotho 96.92138832 51 33 
Liberia 96.98889964 54 34 
Sierra Leone 96.99710808 56 35 
Algeria 97.1782761 61 36 
Sudan 97.3096598 63 37 
Comoros 97.4256678 66 38 
Cape Verde 97.71694638 75 39 
Morocco 97.77843067 77 40 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 97.81882693 79 41 
Botswana 97.82009676 80 42 
South Africa 97.85122947 81 43 
Zimbabwe 98.25427882 93 44 
Swaziland 98.39942375 103 45 
Tunisia 98.58967243 108 46 
Seychelles 98.6616994 109 47 
Central African Republic 99.02075133 125 48 
Libya 99.55653212 149 49 
Mauritius 100.2538186 172 50 
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Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018) 
Third, Benin’s performance in terms of affordability of electricity supply is shown in Figure 2.5, 
which represents the history of the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity 
supply (RNEEX). The horizontal axis shows the years, and the vertical axis shows the share of 
GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) expressed as a percentage of 
real GDP (constant 2010 US$). It can be seen that the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the 
cost of electricity supply has remained above 99% for the entire period (1980-2015). In other 
words, the cost of electricity in Benin has never exceeded 1% of GDP over the period 1980-2015. 
However, the overall trend of the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply 
(RNEEX) is downward. This indicates that although the share of the cost of electricity supply in 
GDP has remained small (less than 1%), it has an overall upward trend. In other words, the 
general observation over the period 1980-2015 is that electricity supply has become more costly, 
although its overall cost has remained less than 1% of GDP. When compared to other countries in 
terms of affordability risk (proxied by the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of 
electricity), Benin is ranked 156th out of 183 countries in the world and 33rd out of 50 countries in 
Africa (Table 2.6). Table 2.6 shows that the lower the share of GDP not used to cover the cost of 
electricity supply, the higher the risk associated with affordability of electricity supply. In other 
words the share of GDP not used to cover the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) is a decreasing 
function of electricity supply disruption risks associated with affordability of electricity supply.  
It is recommended that Benin attempts to minimize the cost of electricity supply by for instance 
relying less on oil for its domestic electricity production. According to the World Development 
Indicators (2018), 99.457% of the domestic production of electricity in Benin was based on oil in 
2014. As said previously, increases in oil prices augment the production costs of electricity and 
therefore limit the capacity of the country to supply electricity. As mentioned in the national policy 
framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, p. 31), one of the reasons for the low 
financial performance of the national distribution company (SBEE) is the use of fossil fuels such as 
gasoil and jet A-1 for the domestic production of electricity. Jet A-1 is expensive and the price of 
both fossil fuels can fluctuate. This situation has significantly increased the financial cost borne by 
the company while the company’s financial revenue is already low because electricity is sold to 
consumers at a price lower than its production cost.  
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Figure 2.5: History of the share of GDP not dedicated to cover the cost of electricity supply 
in Benin (1980-2015)  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from US EIA (2018), World Bank Commodity 
Markets (2018), and World Development Indicators (2018) 
Table 2.6: African countries’ ranking according to their performance in terms of share of 
GDP not used to cover the cost of electricity supply (RNEEX) (only countries for which data 
is available) 
Countries 
Average RNEEX 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Mozambique 89.89835382 5 1 
Zimbabwe 96.08402116 18 2 
Libya 96.28013947 20 3 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 96.59577449 22 4 
South Africa 96.91035609 27 5 
Zambia 97.27247539 34 6 
Tunisia 98.11899677 53 7 
Congo (Kinshasa) 98.36107382 64 8 
Algeria 98.39890283 69 9 
Namibia 98.41045591 70 10 
Togo 98.47229599 74 11 
Morocco 98.49489588 76 12 
Seychelles 98.53827752 78 13 
Swaziland 98.5583192 80 14 
Lesotho 98.56171802 81 15 
Ghana 98.56993606 82 16 
São Tomé and Principe 98.61461637 87 17 
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Côte d’Ivoire 98.74602536 98 18 
Gambia, The 98.7548455 102 19 
Botswana 98.75610133 104 20 
Malawi 98.7694487 106 21 
Mauritius 98.77364831 107 22 
Cameroon 98.85465186 114 23 
Senegal 98.85766483 115 24 
Cape Verde 98.87534255 116 25 
Ethiopia 98.96554568 129 26 
Mauritania 99.03035476 136 27 
Liberia 99.0367424 137 28 
Kenya 99.08301584 141 29 
Mali 99.20019467 149 30 
Niger 99.22392626 152 31 
Madagascar 99.24878248 155 32 
Benin 99.25073761 156 33 
Sudan 99.25784214 157 34 
Tanzania 99.26241206 158 35 
Gabon 99.35797079 163 36 
Congo (Brazzaville) 99.40204725 165 37 
Uganda 99.40268114 166 38 
Guinea 99.4168149 168 39 
Burundi 99.42799911 169 40 
Burkina Faso 99.43341101 170 41 
Central African Republic 99.45800361 172 42 
Comoros 99.50838943 174 43 
Angola 99.61164683 177 44 
Rwanda 99.63458391 178 45 
Nigeria 99.6733151 179 46 
Sierra Leone 99.7395526 180 47 
Guinea-Bissau 99.82639839 181 48 
Equatorial Guinea 99.8909833 182 49 
Chad 99.91430533 183 50 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from US EIA (2018), World Bank Commodity 
Markets (2018), and World Development Indicators (2018) 
Fourth, Benin’s performance in terms of “acceptability” of the type of electricity produced, in other 
words in terms of the sustainability of the production of electricity (production of electricity using 
unlimited energy resources, and with little damage to the environment) is shown in Figure 2.6. The 
figure represents the history of the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of 
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electricity (RRE) over the period 1996-2016. The horizontal axis shows the years, and the vertical 
axis shows the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of electricity (RRE). In 
Figure 2.6, the origin of the reference frame X (horizontal axis) and Y (vertical axis) is not 0, but 
100, the indicator RRE has been transformed (the number 100 has been added to each values of 
the series on RRE, a detailed explanation has been provided in the methodological section). It can 
be seen that the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of electricity has 
remained less than 6% over the entire period, which indicates that the electricity produced 
domestically in Benin is mainly non-renewable. This constitutes a major risk for the country in 
terms of sustainability of domestic electricity production. As said before, fossil fuel energy 
constitutes limited energy resources. When compared to other countries in terms of long-term 
disruption risk of electricity supply related to the use of unsustainable energy resources, Benin is 
ranked 34th out of 183 countries in the world and 10th out of 50 countries in Africa (Table 2.7). This 
makes Benin one of the countries in Africa and in the world with high risks associated with 
sustainability of electricity supply security. Table 2.7 shows the share of renewable electricity in 
total domestic production of electricity (RRE) is a decreasing function of long-term disruption risks 
of electricity supply related to the use of unsustainable energy resources (countries with low RRE 
have high long-term disruption risks of electricity supply related to the use of unsustainable energy 
resources, while countries with high RRE have low long-term disruption risks of electricity supply 
related to the use of unsustainable energy resources). For a long-term and sustainable security of 
electricity supply, Benin should try to increase its production of renewable electricity, which is an 
unlimited energy resource, rather than electricity produced using fossil fuels. In other words, 
increasing the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of electricity will contribute 
to minimizing long-term electricity supply disruption risks related to the use of unsustainable energy 
resources as inputs for electricity production. As mentioned in the national policy framework for 
electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, pp. 30–31), because of lack of financial investment, there is 
very low usage of Benin’s potential in terms of renewable electricity, as the country has significant 
hydro, solar and wind potential: 85 zones were identified for the construction of hydroelectric dams, 
the solar potential varies between 3.9 and 6.2 kWh per square metre per day (kWh/m2/day), and 
the wind speed measured at an altitude of 10 metre (m) above sea level varies between 3 and 6 
metres per second (m/s). How to attract private investment in the renewable electricity sector 
should be one of the priorities of the country if it aims to ensure a long-term and sustainable 
security of electricity supply. 
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Figure 2.6: History of the share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of 
electricity (RRE) in Benin (1996-2015)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Table 2.7: Ranking of African countries according to their average score related to the share 
of renewable electricity in total domestic production of electricity (average 2011-2015) (only 
countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average RRE 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Chad 100 1 1 
Comoros 100 1 1 
Gambia, The 100 1 1 
Guinea-Bissau 100 1 1 
Liberia 100 1 1 
Libya 100 1 1 
Botswana 100.0370561 22 7 
Niger 100.5118329 28 8 
Algeria 100.6665527 31 9 
Benin 101.1111111 34 10 
South Africa 101.1357147 36 11 
Seychelles 101.2985909 38 12 
Tunisia 102.190804 45 13 
Mauritania 104.6463238 51 14 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 108.8436646 61 15 
São Tomé and Principe 109.3011241 63 16 
Senegal 110.3547894 66 17 
Morocco 112.1528063 71 18 
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Burkina Faso 113.0202246 76 19 
Cape Verde 116.6294332 86 20 
Nigeria 119.140297 89 21 
Mauritius 120.9062318 92 22 
Côte d’Ivoire 123.8231839 97 23 
Equatorial Guinea 125.3664093 100 24 
Tanzania 135.5877234 114 25 
Gabon 142.6372076 121 26 
Rwanda 145.2775501 123 27 
Swaziland 147.0459505 126 28 
Madagascar 151.2768005 129 29 
Mali 152.2608527 130 30 
Zimbabwe 156.1036698 137 31 
Congo (Brazzaville) 156.8217494 138 32 
Angola 159.2156513 142 33 
Ghana 162.8488429 146 34 
Sierra Leone 168.7838795 150 35 
Guinea 170.8747503 151 36 
Sudan 174.0744704 152 37 
Cameroon 175.4868921 154 38 
Kenya 175.9876044 156 39 
Togo 182.9278807 162 40 
Uganda 185.7379413 164 41 
Burundi 187.8535743 165 42 
Malawi 191.1693512 166 43 
Central African Republic 193.4505669 169 44 
Mozambique 194.9936181 170 45 
Namibia 197.6953163 173 46 
Zambia 198.747599 174 47 
Congo (Kinshasa) 199.67107 176 48 
Ethiopia 199.8192374 178 49 
Lesotho 200 183 50 
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Fifth, Benin’s performance in terms of electricity supply self-sufficiency (ESS) (supply disruption 
risks related to the concept of “accessibility) is shown in Figure 2.7which represents the history of 
electricity supply self-sufficiency rate (ESS) over the period 1980-2015. The horizontal axis shows 
the years, and the vertical axis shows the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply expressed as a 
percentage of total domestic supply of electricity (TDES). It can be seen that over the entire period, 
Benin’s self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply has not exceeded 27% over the entire period. In 
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2015 the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply was 22.424%. All this indicates that Benin is 
heavily dependent on importation of electricity in order to reduce its electricity supply gap. As 
mentioned previously, this situation exposes the countries to electricity crises which occur in its 
supplier countries such as Ghana and Nigeria. Whenever these countries reduce their exports of 
electricity to Benin because of the necessity to satisfy their domestic growing demand for 
electricity, electricity supply disruption occurs in Benin. The self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply 
(ESS) is a decreasing function of electricity supply disruption risks related to importation of 
electricity: in other words, a high ESS is associated with low supply disruption risks related to 
importation of electricity, while a low ESS is associated with high supply disruption risks related to 
importation of electricity. Figure 2.7 shows a significant reduction of the rate of electricity supply 
self-sufficiency (ESS) in 1989, 1992, 2002 and 2012. For instance, ESS falls to 4.11% in 2012 
because of the severe electricity crisis due to both reduction of electricity importation and 
weakened capacity of the national distribution company (SBEE) to fill the gap caused by the import 
deficit. Other electricity crises also occurred in 1983, 1995 and 2004, and these can be seen in 
Figure 2.7 by a sudden reduction of the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency in these years. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, droughts in Ghana in 1983, 1994 and 2004 limited the capacity 
of the Akossombo dam to generate electricity, which caused Ghana to reduce its exportation of 
electricity to Benin in these years. The consequence was the sudden reduction of Benin’s 
electricity supply self-sufficiency rate observed in Figure 2.7 in 1983, 1995 and 2004. Although the 
self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply in Benin has remained less than 27% over the entire period 
of 1980 to 2015, it can be seen in Figure 2.7 that there is an upward trend of the supply self-
sufficiency rate (ESS). When compared to other countries in terms of supply disruption risk of 
electricity related to importation of electricity, Benin is ranked 2nd out of 194 countries in the world, 
and 2nd out of 53 countries in Africa (Table 2.8). As proposed in the national policy framework for 
electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, p. 30), Benin should try to increase its self-sufficiency rate 
of electricity supply in order to minimize its dependency vis-à-vis its supplier countries. One of the 
targets of the national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, p. 56) is to 
increase the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply to 70% by 2025.  
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Figure 2.7: History of electricity supply self-sufficiency rate (ESS) in Benin (1980-2015) 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on US EIA (2019) data 
Table 2.8: Ranking of African countries according to their self-sufficiency rate of electricity 
supply (ESS) (Average 2011-2015) (only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average ESS 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Togo 9.862617174 1 1 
Benin 12.3593826 2 2 
Botswana 33.41263613 5 3 
Namibia 37.51515785 6 4 
Niger 37.65697224 7 5 
Swaziland 38.58293401 8 6 
Cameroon 51.22466602 11 7 
Burkina Faso 58.97757748 13 8 
Liberia 66.20746827 15 9 
Madagascar 69.17464028 16 10 
Rwanda 83.58873605 24 11 
Mozambique 83.68722615 25 12 
Morocco 85.00837286 28 13 
Mauritania 90.76176035 35 14 
Gambia, The 92.13495134 38 15 
Djibouti 92.68070243 39 16 
Equatorial Guinea 95.03307144 44 17 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 97.02400069 49 18 
Zimbabwe 97.18919606 50 19 
Lesotho 97.43798323 52 20 
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Tanzania 98.91422371 58 21 
Congo (Kinshasa) 98.94142518 59 22 
Côte d’Ivoire 99.76524247 64 23 
Kenya 99.92685877 68 24 
Angola 100 72 25 
Burundi 100 72 25 
Central African Republic 100 72 25 
Chad 100 72 25 
Congo (Brazzaville) 100 72 25 
Eritrea 100 72 25 
Guinea-Bissau 100 72 25 
Libya 100 72 25 
Malawi 100 72 25 
Mali 100 72 25 
Mauritius 100 72 25 
Nigeria 100 72 25 
São Tomé and Principe 100 72 25 
Senegal 100 72 25 
Seychelles 100 72 25 
Sierra Leone 100 72 25 
Somalia 100 72 25 
Sudan 100 72 25 
Algeria 100.1794753 151 43 
Tunisia 100.3529335 155 44 
South Africa 101.3508327 160 45 
Comoros 101.4984976 162 46 
Guinea 101.7920328 164 47 
Uganda 102.5272239 169 48 
Ghana 104.3359451 172 49 
Zambia 104.978801 174 50 
Cape Verde 107.4761353 179 51 
Gabon 110.2680772 184 52 
Ethiopia 117.7773539 190 53 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on US EIA (2018) data 
Sixth, the performance of Benin with regard to the electricity supply efficiency rate (ESE) (a proxy 
for supply risk related to the concept of availability of electricity) is shown in Figure 2.8 which 
represents the history of Benin’s rate of electricity efficiency over the period 1980-2015. In this 
figure, the horizontal axis represents the years and the vertical axis represents the efficiency rate 
of electricity supply (ESE) expressed as a percentage of total supply of electricity (TES). As said 
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previously, this rate is defined as the ratio of electricity not lost to total supply of electricity. It can 
be seen that over the entire period, the rate of electricity supply efficiency has fluctuated between 
74.86% and 90.65%. In other words, losses of electricity have fluctuated between 9.35% and 
25.14% over the period 1980-2015. ECA (2008) reported that the international standard for 
maximum electricity losses is 12%. Apart from the electricity losses for 1982, which were 9.35%, 
losses of electricity in Benin have always exceeded this international standard. Compared to other 
countries in terms of rate of electricity supply efficiency, Benin is ranked 24th out of 194 countries in 
the world and 11th out of 53 countries in Africa (Table 2.9). All this indicates that the Beninese 
electricity sector is not efficient. As mentioned before, losses of electricity can be technical or non-
technical. Technical losses are related to the technology used for the distribution of electricity, 
while non-technical losses are caused by human behaviour such as electricity thefts, errors in the 
electricity billing system, corruption and poor governance of the electricity distribution system etc. 
As reported by République du Bénin (2008), rapid urbanization and the insufficiency of urban 
distribution lines have caused the development of illegal distribution networks by a proportion of 
the urban population that does not have access to electricity. This situation has increased the non-
technical losses of electricity. As mentioned by République du Bénin (2008), among its goals for 
energy efficiency, the Beninese Ministry of Energy has targeted to reduce electricity losses by 14% 
from 2020 to 2025. 
 
Figure 2.8: History of the rate of electricity supply efficiency in Benin (1980-2015)  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on US EIA (2018) 
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Table 2.9: Ranking of African countries according to their rate of electricity supply 
efficiency (only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average ESE 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
Libya 37.49682826 2 1 
Congo (Brazzaville) 53.35449536 3 2 
Cameroon 74.54729069 10 3 
Ghana 77.64081428 13 4 
Côte d’Ivoire 79.44146525 16 5 
Gabon 79.77281677 17 6 
Tanzania 80.02139063 18 7 
Sudan 80.49059024 21 8 
Algeria 80.98891141 22 9 
Ethiopia 81.02990656 23 10 
Benin 81.04121372 24 11 
Kenya 81.65983843 25 12 
Senegal 82.23062219 27 13 
Zimbabwe 84.15358445 32 14 
Tunisia 84.289576 34 15 
Niger 84.48230799 36 16 
Eritrea 84.66502736 38 17 
Nigeria 86.06372319 46 18 
Zambia 87.17433755 53 19 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 87.92315088 59 20 
Morocco 87.94276629 60 21 
Angola 88.3782508 64 22 
Mozambique 89.50814057 73 23 
Botswana 89.71851966 76 24 
Congo (Kinshasa) 89.78523629 77 25 
Namibia 90.49429483 83 26 
Togo 91.29580153 87 27 
South Africa 91.42614439 91 28 
Cape Verde 92.97878788 106 29 
Central African Republic 93 111 30 
Chad 93 112 30 
Comoros 93 113 30 
Djibouti 93 114 30 
Equatorial Guinea 93 116 30 
Gambia, The 93 117 30 
Guinea 93 120 30 
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Guinea-Bissau 93 121 30 
Liberia 93 123 30 
Madagascar 93 124 30 
Malawi 93 125 30 
Mali 93 127 30 
São Tomé and Principe 93 134 30 
Seychelles 93 135 30 
Sierra Leone 93 136 30 
Somalia 93.00405797 143 45 
Uganda 93.09802424 145 46 
Mauritania 93.09937598 146 47 
Mauritius 93.19316922 149 48 
Rwanda 94.19389814 162 49 
Lesotho 95.36547722 171 50 
Burundi 95.58587586 175 51 
Burkina Faso 95.87156958 177 52 
Swaziland 97.29919462 188 53 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on US EIA (2018) data 
Seventh, the performance of Benin with regard to access to electricity (RACE) (a proxy for 
electricity supply disruption risks related to the concept of “availability”) is shown in Figure 2.9, 
which represents the history of access to electricity (RACE) in Benin over the period 1990-2016. 
The horizontal axis shows the years, and the vertical axis shows the rate of access to electricity as 
a percentage of total population. It can be seen that although access to electricity has been 
growing in Benin, it has remained below 41.5% over the entire period. As said previously, access 
to electricity in Benin in 2016 was 41.40%, which is lower than both the sub-Saharan Africa and the 
world average access to electricity for this year, which are 42.81% and 87.35% respectively. This 
indicates that there is a huge supply gap of electricity in Benin, as a large proportion of the 
population is still without access to electricity. In other words, there is a total and continuous supply 
disruption of electricity encountered daily by the proportion of the population that does not have 
access to electricity. In addition, when compared to other countries, Benin is ranked 29th in the 
world out of 195 countries and 27th in Africa out of 54 countries in terms of rate of access to 
electricity (Table 2.10). In order to reduce this supply gap of electricity, the national framework for 
electricity (République du Bénin, 2008, p. 40) has targeted to increase access to electricity to 95% 
in urban areas and 65% in rural areas by 2025. 
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Figure 2.9: History of access to electricity (RACE) in Benin (1990-2016)  
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Table 2.10: Ranking of African countries according to their rate of access to electricity 
(RACE) (Average 2011-2015) (only countries for which data is available) 
Countries 
Average RACE 
(2011-2015) 
World ranking Africa ranking 
South Sudan 5.921040773 1 1 
Burundi 6.654797745 2 2 
Chad 7.372249832 3 3 
Liberia 9.147955093 4 4 
Malawi 9.34 5 5 
Central African Republic 12.19305954 6 6 
Guinea-Bissau 13.48163208 7 7 
Congo (Kinshasa) 14.76484974 8 8 
Niger 14.95419975 9 9 
Sierra Leone 15.07525162 10 10 
Madagascar 16.5128157 11 11 
Tanzania 16.66203583 12 12 
Uganda 16.72299278 13 13 
Rwanda 16.93395531 14 14 
Burkina Faso 17.37564377 15 15 
Mozambique 21.26170906 17 16 
Lesotho 24.65037857 18 17 
Somalia 25.10658989 19 18 
Zambia 26.73860245 20 19 
Ethiopia 28.40510506 21 20 
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Guinea 28.55957359 22 21 
Mali 30.44441093 23 22 
Kenya 33.68440201 24 23 
Zimbabwe 35.34113815 26 24 
Angola 36.28249084 27 25 
Mauritania 37.03605591 28 26 
Benin 37.34653671 29 27 
Sudan 38.46251953 31 28 
Togo 42.20080536 33 29 
Eritrea 43.18904495 35 30 
Gambia, The 44.06586838 36 31 
Namibia 48.32556351 38 32 
Congo (Brazzaville) 49.64273224 39 33 
Djibouti 52.8882457 40 34 
Botswana 54.88303418 42 35 
Nigeria 54.9283638 43 36 
Cameroon 56.21290131 44 37 
Swaziland 58.37334824 46 38 
Senegal 58.43111954 47 39 
Côte d’Ivoire 60.40220932 48 40 
São Tomé and Principe 62.89689407 50 41 
Equatorial Guinea 66.70395233 51 42 
Comoros 70.72298981 54 43 
Ghana 71.61287974 55 44 
South Africa 85.38 63 45 
Cape Verde 85.51855621 64 46 
Gabon 88.24295868 68 47 
Morocco 95.34494354 83 48 
Libya 98.52285156 94 49 
Seychelles 98.66741638 95 50 
Mauritius 98.82798584 97 51 
Algeria 99.08559963 98 52 
Tunisia 99.7 110 53 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 99.86965332 120 54 
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Eighth, the performance of Benin with regard to real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) (expressed as a 
percentage of the world annual average real GDP per capita) is shown in Figure 2.10, which 
represents the history of Benin’s real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) (expressed as a percentage of 
the world annual average real GDP per capita) over the period 1960-2017. The vertical axis shows 
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Benin’s real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) expressed as a percentage of the world annual average 
real GDP per capita, and the horizontal axis shows the corresponding years. It can be seen that on 
average, RGDPcW has been decreasing over the period 1960-2017 (as shown by the overall 
downward trend line in Figure 2.10). This indicates that over the period 1960-2017, the average 
person living in Benin has become more and more less wealthy compared to the average person 
living in the world. This also indicates that over the period 1960-2017, Benin as a country has 
become more and more financially unable to offer to its population a standard of living similar to 
the average standard of living of the population of the rest of the world. However, the absolute 
value of real GDP per capita (RGDPc) has been increasing over the period (Figure 2.11). This 
indicates that although Benin as a country has become more and more financially unable to offer 
its population a standard of living similar to the average standard of living of the population of the 
rest of the world, the country’s wealth has increased over the period 1960-2017. In other words, 
Benin has become more and more financially capable of investing in electricity infrastructure and 
utilities, even if such financial capability is very low compared to the financial capability of the 
average country of the world. Such increase in real GDP per capita (RGDPc) did not prevent the 
country from continuing to need some financial investment in the electricity sector. As reported by 
the national policy framework for electricity (République du Bénin, 2008 pp. 30–31), one of the 
major causes of the supply gap of electricity is the lack of financial investment in electricity 
infrastructure and utilities. Compared to other countries of the world in terms of real GDP per capita 
(RGDPcW) (expressed as a percentage of the world annual average real GDP per capita), Benin is 
ranked 25th in the world out of 189 countries and 22nd in Africa out of 51 countries (Table 2.11). 
 
Figure 2.10: History of Benin’s real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) (as a percentage of the world 
annual average real GDP per capita) (1960-2017)  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the World Development Indicators (2018) data 
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Figure 2.11: History of Benin’s real GDP per capita (RGDPc) (1960-2017) 
Source: World Development Indicators (2018) 
Table 2.11: Ranking of African countries according to their real GDP per capita (RGDPcW) 
(expressed as a percentage of the world annual average real GDP per capita) (Average 
2011-2015) (only countries for which data is available) 
Countries Average RGDPcW (2011-2015) World ranking Africa ranking 
Eritrea 1.06001201 1 1 
Burundi 2.361895346 2 2 
Liberia 3.670503183 3 3 
Central African Republic 3.725700527 4 4 
Niger 3.726104872 5 5 
Congo (Kinshasa) 3.778579543 6 6 
Madagascar 4.090782913 7 7 
Ethiopia 4.245007745 8 8 
Mozambique 4.738803454 9 9 
Malawi 4.74634177 10 10 
Sierra Leone 4.87057474 11 11 
Togo 5.205088958 12 12 
Gambia, The 5.339755082 13 13 
Guinea-Bissau 5.599695651 14 14 
Burkina Faso 6.264754628 16 15 
Uganda 6.393076632 17 16 
Rwanda 6.503623674 19 17 
Mali 7.020294394 20 18 
Guinea 7.022463756 21 19 
Comoros 7.770610821 23 20 
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Tanzania 7.811387113 24 21 
Benin 8.01050221 25 22 
Zimbabwe 9.098180013 28 23 
Chad 9.306923282 30 24 
Senegal 10.16671357 32 25 
Kenya 10.51066494 34 26 
São Tomé and Principe 12.03610606 37 27 
Mauritania 12.83368055 38 28 
Lesotho 13.00520058 39 29 
Côte d’Ivoire 13.06263215 40 30 
Cameroon 13.93976004 42 31 
Zambia 15.82861638 47 32 
Ghana 16.01417991 48 33 
Sudan 17.90507698 51 34 
Nigeria 24.82230117 58 35 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 26.15700125 59 36 
Congo (Brazzaville) 28.42688711 60 37 
Morocco 30.70954065 63 38 
Cape Verde 33.94089746 67 39 
Angola 36.69284688 78 40 
Swaziland 38.85854893 80 41 
Tunisia 41.83716562 82 42 
Algeria 46.28733477 85 43 
Namibia 57.18025337 94 44 
Botswana 71.46098775 106 45 
Libya 72.95814748 108 46 
South Africa 75.36093508 110 47 
Mauritius 88.86278849 116 48 
Gabon 93.74590615 119 49 
Seychelles 125.1718355 130 50 
Equatorial Guinea 165.1068608 141 51 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the World Development Indicators (2018) data 
2.6  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
In this chapter an index of electricity supply security that focuses on disruption risk to electricity has 
been constructed. With this index, an assessment of the overall performance of Benin in terms of 
disruption risks to electricity supply has been done, which revealed that Benin has a very high level 
of disruption risk to electricity supply. As a result, an assessment of the performance of Benin 
according to each component of the index has been done which revealed that the performance of 
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Benin in terms of self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply, rate of access to electricity, rate of 
electricity supply efficiency, share of renewable electricity in total domestic production of electricity, 
governance, ratio of growth of urban access to electricity to growth of the urbanization rate, are all 
low. Especially for the rate of electricity supply self-sufficiency, Benin is the second worst in the 
world after Togo over the period 2011-2015 (see Table 2.8). This suggests that to improve its 
overall performance in terms of disruption risk to electricity supply, Benin must first improve its 
governance system as it affects the delivery of electricity to consumers. Second, the country must 
improve its level of domestic production of electricity. The aim of the national policy framework is to 
increase the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply to 70% by 2025. Reducing its dependency on 
importation will significantly improve Benin’s overall performance in terms of disruption risk to 
electricity supply. Third, the country must improve its electricity supply efficiency rate by reducing 
electricity loss. Finally, in order to align the speed of urbanization with the speed of urban access to 
electricity, Benin must create incentives for the rural population to stay in rural areas by building 
more social and economic infrastructure in those areas. Otherwise, the high rate of migration from 
urban to rural area will continue, and will increase the rate of urbanization, while the rate of urban 
access to electricity is not as fast. The consequence will be an increasing urban supply gap of 
electricity. Both improvement of the self-sufficiency rate of electricity supply and of the electricity 
supply efficiency rate require important investments in electricity infrastructure, while Benin’s 
wealth as illustrated by its GDP per capita is very low. This requires the country to create 
incentives for foreign and domestic private investors and development finance institutions to invest 
into the Beninese electricity sector. Other ways of financing electricity infrastructure have also been 
identified by in the national policy framework for electricity. One of these is an indirect financing 
mechanism, which suggests first using donors or national budget funds to finance electricity 
infrastructure that will contribute to minimizing electricity losses. The financing mechanism then 
recommends using the gain in GDP caused by reductions in electricity loss to reimburse the 
donors or national budget funds. These recommendations of the national policy framework 
therefore require an assessment of the gain in GDP resulting from reduction in electricity loss. In 
other words, they require an assessment of the effect of electricity loss on GDP. This assessment 
is the focus of the following chapter.  
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